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Statutory

Obsolescence

By

Significa,nt

GRANT GILl\10RE

The New

A. Bigelow Professor 0/ Law
University of C Iiicago Law School

Harry
The

It

that

of

first published in 39 University of Colorado
461, and is reprinted here with the kind permission

was

Law Review

publication

With the

and

of the author.

of the Uniform Commercial Code
except Louisiana, the problem of how we
are
to
live with the Code, so-called, over the next
going
half century becomes worth thinking about. To help us
with our thinking we have, fortunately, the accumulated
experience of living with the Code's predecessors during
the last half century.
in all

enactment

states

It is

that the conditions of the first

true

tion of commercial

the

law,

general

which followed

1900,

codifica
were

by

the conditions of the second gen
eral codification-that is, the Code. In the intervening
no

means

half century

undergone,

same as

our
legal system had suffered, or at all
fundamental change. We had traveled

events
a con

siderable distance

along the road which has led us from
as
essentially a common law system,
somewhat eroded by statutes, to what we have come to
think of as essentially a statutory system in which the
few remaining common law enclaves are no doubt des
what

was

tined

to

statutes,

Individual

Challenge

By

THE HONORABLE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Attorney General of Massachusetts

The C. R. Musser Lecture, delivered
on April 26, 1967

gradually

be

well

notably changed.

as

our

at

The

University of Chicago

Law School

Only yesterday, well within the memories of those of
us fortunate
enough to have achieved the congenial
plateau of middle age, this nation was engaged in a strug
gle to meet the most basic demands of the general wel
fare. The stubborn maladies of prolonged depression and
massive unemployment had called forth a bewildering
variety of governmental remedies, some restorative, some
merely palliative, some ultimately to be prophylactic. In
part, the struggle involved the resistance of substantial
portions of the body politic to accepting any medicine at
all. In due course, at any rate, the depression ended and
war
brought a return to full employment. And gradually
over the next two decades there
developed a broad-based
acceptance of the social measures borrowed and impro
vised during the depression years. Toward the end of this

period

some

among us, it is true, still

conceived

as

Participation:
in American

Government

The paper which follows was the John R. Coen Lecture, de
livered at the University of Colorado School of Law on April

27, 1967.

Number 2

saw

such

(Continued

programs
on

page

37)

absorbed. Our attitudes toward
ideas about drafting style, had

The 1950 codification was, then,

a

quite

different animal from the 1900 codification. Admitting
that, there is still profit to be derived from a consideration
of the adventures and misadventures, most of them

unexpected, which our first batch of codifying
experienced during their half-century on, as we

statutes

say, the

books.
A

preliminary problem is why what
was the
subject matter of

mercial law"
scale

experiment

we

call "com

the first

in codification in this country,

as

large
well
The Honorable Elliot

(Continued

on

page

29)

chusetts, delivering the

Richardson, Attorney

General of Massa

C. R. Musser Lecture for 1967.
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A.

Harry

Gilmore

Bigelow
SHELDON TEFFT

By

University of Chicago

Law School

is named for

The

Bigelow Professorship
Bigelow, whose generous bequest

for the Board of Trustees

Grant Gilmore

Harry Augustus

has made it

possible

add another much-needed

to

professorship to the Faculty of the Law School. Mr.
Bigelow was the youngest of that small group of lawyers
that William Rainey Harper brought to Chicago early
in the twentieth century

School

the

was

only

one

He

was

Faculty.

had been

out

to

establish its Law School. The

year old when Mr. Bigelow joined
then under thirty years of age and

of law school

slightly

more

than four

experience as a teacher consisted of one semes
part-time instructor in criminal law.
A native of Norwood, Massachusetts, Mr. Bigelow was
a
graduate of Harvard College, Class of 1896, where he
had been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and of the Harva'rd
Law School, Class of 1899, where he had been an editor
years. His
ter as a

of the Harvard Law Review. After
law clerk in

a

conveyancing

period

as

a

office in Boston and

as

a

part-time

instructor in Criminal Law

removed

to

years

as

a

Islands. In

Jr., who
ize the

low

to

brief

a

at

Harvard, he had

Honolulu where he spent three very active
junior member of the Bar of the Hawaiian

January, 1904, Acting

was

then

on

Joseph H. Beale,
to help organ
persuaded Mr. Bige
join the Faculty at

Dean

leave from Harvard

law school in the west,
abandon the practice and

new

Chicago. There he spent
for nearly half a century
Law School Faculty.

the remainder of his life and
was an active member of the

to

he achieved and merited the

brillian t and

teach. Within

reputation

of

a

short time

being

teacher. To sit in his classes

most

a

an
gifted
who
the
students
developed
by
experience highly prized
a deep affection for him in spite of the terrifying intel
lectual chastisement which he frequently meted to those
whose recitations were confused or slipshod. His reputa
tion as a teacher and scholar was enhanced by the publi

cation of his casebooks

and The Law

on

of Rights

The Law

was

of Personal Property

in Land. These

soon

became

standard classroom materials and extended his influence
to include a large proportion of the students in American
law schools.

Though

Mr.

Bigelow

as

was

a

superb master of
recognized that

method of instruction, he early
areas it was so cumbersome and

the
in

case

some

time-consuming as to be
ineffective. Furthermore, his experience indicated that
investigations of legal questions that were limited to
the materials in the law reports

were

Bigelow

to

often sterile. At

a

{he

first

Harry

Chair

announcing

that the

Professor

designated
Bigelow

Professor

A.

of Law.
Born in Boston in 1910, Grant Gilmore received an
1931, and a PhD. in Romance Languages in

A.B. in

1936, both from Yale University. Following three years
teacher of French at Yale, he entered the Yale Law
School, and was awarded the LL.B. in 1942. He practiced
as a

law in New York

and served in the Office of the

City,

General Counsel of the
New Haven

Navy Department, before
his

re

in law teach

turning
begin
ing and legal scholarship.
Professor Gilmore taught at Yale for nineteen years,
before becoming a member of the Faculty of the Uni
versity of Chicago Law School in 1965. During that pe
riod he was a Visiting Professor at Berkeley, Chicago,
Columbia and Harvard, and at the Salzburg Seminar in
to

to

career

American Studies.
In

1966,

as

previously

Gilmore received the

noted in the Record, Professor
Prize for his two

James Barr Ames

volume

work, Security Interests in Personal Property. He
author, with Charles Black, of The Law of
Admiralty.
is also the

We call

to

the reader's attention Professor Sheldon

Tefft's admirable memoir of Dean
pears

Bigelow,

which ap

nearby.

time when it

was

fashionable

in the hands of students

his Introduction

The combination of an extremely acute analytical
mind, unusual facility of lucid, succinct, lively presenta
tion and a wide range of interests made Mr. Bigelow ex

ceptionally well-qualified

Appointed

The School takes great pleasure in
President of the University has

lames Parker Hall Professor of Law
The

Vol. 15 No.2

to

to

believe that textbooks

pernicious, he published
of Real Property, a brief

were

the Law

historical introduction that has

proved

to

be

an

invaluable

tool for the student of the modern land law.

Bigelow realized that an effective understanding
frequently requires the study of subjects that,
traditionally, have been excluded from law schools. Un
der his leadership the curriculum at Chicago was ex
panded to include subjects such as accounting, economics
and psychology. He also encouraged the faculty to pio
neer in the
development of a program of tutorial instruc
tion that has greatly enriched the training that the school
affords its students and has been widely copied by Ameri
Mr.

of law

can

law schools.

When the American Law Institute

was

organized,

Mr.

rendered

Bigelow
distinguished assistance with the prep
aration of the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws and
the Restatement

of the Law of Property of which he was,
originally,
Reporter. After the untimely death of
James Parker Hall in 1928, the University selected Mr.
the

Bigelow as
designated

second Dean of the Law School. He
as

In 1933 Mr.

the first

Bigelow

John
was

was

also

P. Wilson Professor.

appointed

Trustee in Bank-

(Continued

on

page

37)
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Distinguished Lectureships

Henry Simons Lecture was established in honor of
Henry Simons, who was the distinguished prede

the late

cessor of Aaron Director and Ronald Coase as Professor
of Economics in the Law School. As such, the lecture
ship is both a personal tribute to an eminent man, and a

symbol

of the School's

continuing, deep-seated interest'

in the

interrelationship of economics
May, 1967, the Henry Simons Lecture

Milton

Friedman,

and the law. In

Paul Snowden Russell

delivered

by
Distinguished

was

Service Professor of

Economics, The University of Chi
Professor
Friedman's
lecture, on "The Monetary
cago.
and
of
Theory
Policy
Henry Simons," appears in The
Law
and
Economics, Volume X, Page 1,
Journal of

At the reception preceding the Henry Simons Lecture, left
right, Jean Allard, JD'51, Donald E. Egan, '61, and Alan
Orschel, JD'64. All are members of the Alumni Board.

to

R.

(1967).
If law and economics are sister disciplines, the rela
tionship of law and government may be closer to a long

standing marriage.

of the continu
of
ing
problems government that
the C. R. Musser lecture was established by the General
Service Foundation, in honor of a distinguished citizen
with a deep interest in this range of problems. The Lec
concern

It

was

in

recognition

of the law with

tureship is reserved to one
ranking position in public

who

holds,

or

has

held, high

service. In the academic year
the
Musser
was
Lecture
just past,
given by the Honorable
Elliot L. Richardson, currently Attorney General, and

Reversing
has posed

the usual
a

of nature, Richard H. Levin, JD'37,
which gives pause to Professor Philip B.

course

question

Kurland.

Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts. Attor
General
Richardson's Musser Lecture appears else
ney
where in this issue of the Record.

formerly

Dean Neal greets Maurice Rosenfield, JD'38, Richard H.
JD'37, and former Dean Wilber G. Katz.

Milton Friedman, Paul Snowden Russell Distinguished Service
Professor of Economics, and Henry Simons Lecturer for 1966-67,
chats with Professor Dallin Oaks, JD'57, and Preble Stolz, JD'56,
Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley.

At the

Carlisle

Levin,

reception preceding the Henry Simons Lecture, John
Pryor, JD'lO, talks with Sheldon Tefft, James Parker Hall

Professor of Law.

Vol. 15 No.2

The Law School Record

4

Forthcoming
For

more

sored

a

Levi President-Elect

Conferences

than fifteen years, the Law School has spon
on areas of
special interest

series of Conferences

in the law. Two such Conferences

are

scheduled for the

Winter Quarter, 1968.

activity

at

not

all. Like the Conference

really

a

Law

Consumer

on

Credit and the Poor, held in 1965-66, and the Conference
on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, held last year, this
Conference

on

run

entirely by

on,

but

not

Public

Employees

will be

planned

and

students of the Law School. It will focus

be confined to, problems of unionization of
A detailed program will be available

public employees.
in the

near

future. The Conference will be held

ary 2 and 3, 1968.
A Conference tentatively titled

Law" will take
ers

and

on

"Privacy, Policy

place on February

23 and

Febru

and the

24, 1968. Speak

topics will include:

unlikely

unaware

that any reader of this

publication

of the selection of Edward H. Levi

dent-Elect of The

of

University

Chicago.

as

is

Presi

The Record

wishes, nevertheless,
express the great pleasure of Law
and
students
in
this selection and to extend our
FacuIty

congratulations

HENKIN, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law
and Diplomacy, Columbia University.

A native

1932, and
cago. He

MARC A.

FRANKLIN, Professor of

as a Threat to Privacy." ARTHUR MILLER,
Law, University of Michigan.
"Technology and Privacy." ALAN F. WESTIN, Professor of
Public Law and Government, Columbia University; Author of
Privacy and Freedom (1967).
"Privacy and the Welfare Recipient." ROBERT J. LEVY, Pro
fessor of Law, University of Minnesota.
"Privacy and Taxation." MITCHELL ROGOVIN, Assistant At
torney General of the United States, Tax Division.
"Privacy and Government Employment." BENNETT BOSKEY,
Volpey, Boskey and Lyons, Washington; formerly Deputy Gen
eral Counsel, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.
"Privacy and the Census." PHILIP M. HAUSER, Professor of
Sociology, The University of Chicago; formerly Acting Director,

"The Computer

Professor of

U.S. Census Bureau.

and

to

the

University's

Mr. Levi received his Ph.B. in

Hyde Parker,

University of Chi
at Yale, where he
earned the J.S.D. in 1938. Eleven years later, the Univer
sity of Michigan awarded him an honorary LL.D.
He joined the Law FacuIty in 1936, and is still an active
member, having taught a Seminar in Jurisprudence in

1935, both from The
J.D.
was later a
Sterling Fellow
in

the academic year 1966-67. He served as Dean of the Law
School from 1950 until 1962, when he became Provost of
as

portion of his tenure
Acting Dean of the Col
a basic
over
such, presided
reorganization

University. During

Provost,

lege,

and

of its

Mr. Levi

as

a

substantial

and curriculum.

structure

including Special

posts,

also

was

Mr. Levi has served in

LOUIS

Legal Map for Privacy."
Law, Stanford University.

Mr. Levi

to

Board of Trustees.

the

Sociological View of Privacy." EDWARD SHILS, Professor
of Sociology and of Social Thought, The University of Chicago;
Fellow of Kings College, Cambridge University.
"Constitutional Dimensions of Privacy in the United States."
"A

"A

most

still

to

The first of these Conferences is
School

It is

a

variety of governmental
to the U. S. Attorney
Division, Department of

wide

Assistant

General; First Assistant, War
Justice; First Assistant, Antitrust Division, Department
of Justice; and Counsel, Subcommittee on Monopoly
Power of the Judiciary Committee of the House. He was
also counsel

the

to

drafting

the Federation of Atomic Scientists

of the U. S. Atomic

He has served

member of the Board of the Social

as a

Science Research

Council,

dation-sponsored

committee

of the

of

University

during

Act.

Energy

as a

member of the Ford Foun

to

Pittsburgh

Citizens Commission

on

examine the future role

and

as a

member of the

Graduate Medical

Education,

at

the invitation of the American Medical Association. He
is currently a member of the Board of Directors of the

Legal Center, a trustee of the Institute for
Psychoanalysis and a fellow of the American Bar Foun
dation and of the American Academy of Arts and Sci
International

"Privacy and the White House." PIERRE SALINGER, Vice Pres
ident, Continental Airlines; formerly Press Secretary to the Presi
dent of the United States.
"A Policy for Privacy." A Panel Discussion by BRUNO BET
TELHEIM, Stella M. Rowley Professor of Education, Professor

Psychology and Psychiatry, and Principal of the Sonia Shank
man Orthogenic School, The U ni versi ty of Chicago ; WALTER J.
BLUM, Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; GER
HARD CASPER, Associate Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago; HARRY KALVEN, Jr., Professor of Law, The Univer
sity of Chicago; and Professor WESTIN.
It should be noted that this program is still somewhat

of

tentative, and minor changes

may therefore

occur.

In

ences.

addition, he is

a

member of the Council of the

American Law Institute and chairman of the Council

Education for Professional

on

Responsibility.

published works include An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning (1948), Four Talks on Legal Education
(1952), and numerous articles and monographs.
Mr. Levi will take office as President of The University
His

in

upon the retirement of the incumbent,
Wells Beadle. Amongst all the adulatory state

October, 1968,

George
ments
seem

elicited

to

his

election, two, of one sentence each,
appropriate. Lawrence A. Kimp
of the University from 1951 until 1960,

by

this writer

ton, Chancellor

most

said: "Mr. Levi is the very best possible choice for the
President of the University." An unidentified Fac

new
••

ulty colleague
man on

this

described him

most

as

"the

most

extraordinary campus."

extraordinary

Vol. 15 No.2
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Friends

As the reader may recall, the imminent retirement of
the Honorable Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice of the

United States Supreme Court, and the
appointment of
his son, Ramsey Clark, JD'51, to be Attorney General
of the United States, were announced
simultaneously in
last spring. Mr. Justice Clark has for manx
been
one
of the most active and valuable members
years
of the Law School Visiting Committee. He has also
served as Chairman of the distinguished committee
which selects the recipients of the School's Mechem

Washington

The Attorney General has always been
close to, and greatly interested in, his Law School, having
served several terms on the Board of Directors of the
Law Alumni Association.

Scholarships.

Mr. and Mrs. Robert N.
Clark.

Kharasch, JD'51, chat with

Mr.

Justice

As an indication of the respect and affection which the
School and its alumni feel for these
gentlemen, the
Alumni Club of Metropolitan Washington held a recep
tion in their honor last

May. Almost two hundred people,
both
alumni
and non-alumni friends and ad
including
mirers of the Clarks, attended. George Miron, JD'56,
President of the Washington Club, did a splendid job
with the arrangements.
Attorney General Clark with Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe,
JD'50, left, and George Miron, JD'56, President of the Washing
ton

Law Alumni.

Mr.

Justice Clark with Richard Berryman, JD'57, Vice President

Of the Constitution and
Professor Kurland
Professor

Philip B. Kurland has been appointed Chief
Consultant to the new Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers of the United States Senate. In
announcing the
appointment, Senator Sam J. Ervin, [r., Subcommittee
Chairman, said: "Professor Kurland is one of the greatest
authorities'
ica has

tional

sense

He is also

and

one

the United States Constitution that Amer
known. He is not only a scholar in the tradi
of knowing court decisions and their trends.

on

ever

a

brilliant

of those

legal technician,

rare men

an

of the

Washington

Law Alumni.

eloquent writer
language, the

who know the

intent, and the history of the Constitution. His appoint

responsible and productive investigation."
Professor Kurland has been a member of the Law Fac
ulty for fourteen years. He is the editor of The Supreme
Court Review, and author or editor of Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States (1951); Mr. Justice
(1956; 2d ed. 1964); Religion and the Law: Of Church
ment ensures a

and State and the

Supreme

Court

(1962); Frankfurter,
Things that Matter (1965);
The Great Charter (1965; 2d ed. 1966); and The Su
preme Court and the Constitution (1965).
Of

Law and

Life

and Other

Attorney General Clark with, left to right, George Miron, JD'56,
S. Harrison Kahn, JD'33, and Lester
Uretz, JD'48, Chief Counsel
of the Internal Revenue Service.
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The Uses of

Sociology

Annual Alumni

the

In

Professions: The Law
By

HANS ZEISEL

Projessor of Law and Sociology
TIle University of Chicago Law School
The paper which follows is a chapter from The Uses of Sociology,
edited by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William H. Sewall, and Harold L.
which is

Wilensky,

expected

to

appear

at

about the

time

same

as

copyrighted, 1967, by Basic Books,
kind permission Professor Zeisel's chapter appears

this issue of the Record. It is

Inc., by whose
here.

law, from

The

view, is a continuous process of syn
rules, with new facts at times engen

one

facts and

thesizing
dering new

rules. The process takes place wherever 'law
is made: in the legislatures, in the administrative agen
in the

cies, and

courts.

own,

a

of forms.

variety

is still the witness who reports

his

primary
private experience. Occasionally, however, facts
source

on

are

presented as cumulative knowledge, systematically gath
ered through surveys and most recently also through ex
periments, methods that

are

part of the tool chest of the

social sciences.
The survey

as

a

source

modern social science
one

of its

major

by

of facts for the law

predates

centuries and 'constitutes in fact

historical roots? But it is

years that the law has

School, the Alumni Day

Alumni

Held

is

insure that the School's

Day.
designed to

at

the Law

graduates

are

kept

fully informed of its progress and problems, and to bring
them into close personal contact with Faculty and stu
dents. Alumni

attending

include the officers and direc

of the Alumni Association, and representatives of
local and regional alumni groups throughout the country.
The Third Annual Alumni Day was scheduled for
tors

May 5, 1967,

in order

to

coincide with the

Special

Con

of the

vocation in Celebration of the 75th

Anniversary
University. Visiting alumni attended the Convocation in
the morning, then lunched with the Dean and with law
students.

The facts reach these lawmakers in
The

Day

For the past three years, the University of Chicago Law
School Alumni Association has sponsored an annual

begun

to use

in

In the

afternoon, they heard

a

discussion of

recent

Professors

Harry Kalven, [r.,
by
Supreme
and Philip B. Kurland. This was followed by a report
on
special educational programs outside the formal aca
demic curriculum, by Professor Dallin H. Oaks. The
quarterly Board Meeting then took place.
The day was concluded with cocktails and dinner with
the Law Faculty, and attendance at the Third Henry
Court

cases

Simons Lecture.

only
operations

recent

research

rigor. The uses the law has
systematic investigations differ widely,
from simple citation in a brief or opinion to being the
decisive ground for a judgment or a legal reform.' The
great majority of the studies that come before the law
raise only private issues, assisting courts and agencies in
individual litigation. They may be surveys of the quality
of contracted goods, of the geographic range from which

conducted with technical
made of such

a

drive-in theater draws its clientele, of the commercial

effects of a merger, or of the socioeconomic structure of the
jurors in a certain community. But although such studies

perfection and ingenuity,
not be discussed here. Their variety is too great,
will
they
and they seldom reach the higher courts, hence they sel
dom affect legal rule making; and they have been suffi
ciently discussed elsewhere."
times gems of technical

are at

The studies

shall discuss here deal with

we

more

At

the

same

gathering, Professor Stanley A. Kaplan, JD'33,
Chicago, Daniel Fogel, President of the Los
Alumni, and Milton Shadur, of Chicago, all three

Mildred J. Giese, of

Angeles

Law

members of the Class of 1949.

gen

problems: with substantive rules of law, with pro
cedural rules, or with institutions that are a mixture of

eral

both. Some of these studies
institution without
stream

many
trast,

of

legal

sources
are

resolution

that

designed

shape
to

are

broad surveys of

specific focus; they
only slowly,

as

the law. Other

illuminate if

not

but

one

studies,
to

a

legal
the

enter

of the

in

resolve

con

one

issue; these investigations-sometimes

narrow,

crucial

they

controlled

are

more

experiments-are bound

to

(Continued

affect the
on

page

21)

Alumni, students and Faculty met in Burton Lounge prior to
lunch on Alumni Day. Visible above are, left to right, Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., JD'38, Richard H. Levin, JD'37, Mrs. Roberta
Ramo, JD'67, and David L. James, JD'60, representing the New
York Law Alumni.
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The Alumni and the School
The program of Law Alumni meetings throughout the
country continues to be vigorous and varied. In June,

Professor Dallin H. Oaks, JD'57, spoke at an alumni
luncheon held in connection with the Annual Meeting
of the Illinois State Bar Association, in Peoria; Assistant
Dean

James

M.

Ratcliffe, JD'50, presided.

Professor Allison Dunham was the principal speaker
at the
University of Chicago Law School Alumni Lunch
eon held
during the Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association in Honolulu in August, with Dean Rat
cliffe again presiding.
In

September, Harry

more

A.

Bigelow

and Dean Ratcliffe rode circuit

Professor Gilmore

Professor Grant Gil
on the Pacific Coast.

the

principal speaker at a meeting
in Monterey, California, arranged by John N. Shephard,
JD'41, during the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of
was

California. Later in the
guest of honor
Meeting of the

week, Professor Gilmore

breakfast held

at a

as

was

Moore W.

Peregrine greets Mrs. Albert L. Hopkins, while Mrs.
Hopkins, JD'08 renew an old acquaintance

Phil C. Neal and Mr.

ship.

the

part of the Annual

Oregon State Bar Association, in Seaside,
Gabinet, JD'54, President of the Portland
Alumni Club, and John C. McLean, JD'51, arranged for
Leon

Oregon.

this colorful
It

event.

followed

by a luncheon gathering of the School's
Seattle alumni, organized by Gene B. Brandzel, JD'61,
President of the Puget Sound Alumni Club.
was

By the

time this is

will have

meeting

appeared

printed,

as

Professor

Philip B. Kurland
speaker at a luncheon
Metropolitan Washing

the featured

of the Alumni Club of

D.C., under the auspices of George Miron, JD'56,
President, and Richard B. Berryman, JD'57, Vice Presi
ton,

dent.

Plans

being made for the Annual Meeting of
Club of Metropolitan New York in late Jan

are now

the Alumni
uary, for

a

San Francisco

meeting

at

about the

ter

approximately five
and early spring.

other such

gatherings

Siegel, the Honorable
A. Lippitz, David M.

gather at the Reception before the
right: Abner J. Mikva, Jack M.
Ramsey Clark, Paul A. Rosenblum, Charles
Sloan, and Alfred M. Palfi.

The

Committee

to

same

time, for Los Angeles later in the Winter Quarter, and
for

Members of the Class of 1951
Annual Alumni Dinner. Left

in late win

Visiting

The Annual Meeting of the Law School Visiting Com
mittee was held on April 7, 1967. The Committee devoted
the morning to a discussion with Dean Neal of recent

developments
currently

it is

in the School and of

faced. A

problems

with which

group of law students then
lunched with the Committee in Burton Dining Hall.

The afternoon

was

large

devoted

to a

discussion of the Law

School's

curriculum, led by Professors Bernard Meltzer,
Edmund Kitch, Kenneth Dam and Gerhard Casper. In
late afternoon, the Committee met in executive session,
with the Honorable Waiter V. Schaefer, JD '28, Com
mittee Chairman, presiding.

A partial view of the Alumni Luncheon held during the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association in Honolulu last
August. The luncheon speaker was Professor Allison Dunham.

The Annual Meeting was concluded with cocktails
and dinner for the Committee and the F acuity, followed
by a talk by Ronald H. Coase, Professor of Economics in
the Law School, on the basic assumptions which distin

guish

classical economists from those of other views.
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The Class of 1932
On

a

tour

of the Law

Buildings preceding
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Alumni Reunions Flourish
their 35th Reunion

Dinner.

The number and size of class reunions among Law
a
steady and gratifying in
crease. In June, the Class of 1927 held its Fortieth Anni
School alumni have shown
versary Reunion Dinner

at

the Ambassador West Hotel.

handled

by Miss Rhea Brenwasser,
Rosenthal, who presided. In
addition to Dean Phil C. Neal, who spoke briefly follow
ing the dinner, guests of the Class included Mrs. Neal,
Professor Emeritus and Mrs. George G. Bogert, and
Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe. The program also
featured several songs by Morton John Barnard and
Arrangements were
Meyer J. Myer, and

M. A.

varied comments, ribald and reverent, from a number of
members of the Class.
The Thirty-Fifth Anniversary Reunion of the Class of
1932 took place in September, beginning with a tour of
the Laird Bell Law Quadrangle and continuing with
dinner at the Center for Continuing Education. C.
Bouton

McDougal

was

Chairman of a

large

and active

Reunion Committee. Class President Leonard P. Aries

presided

at

the dinner, which

B. Fried and Frank

Dean Neal

were

was

arranged by

Herbert

Mortimer

the

Greenberg.
principal speakers.

J. Adler and
Other Faculty

guests of the Class included Mrs. Adler and Mrs. Neal,
Professor Emeritus and Mrs. George G. Bogert, Profes
sor and Mrs. Sheldon Tefft, former Dean and Mrs.
Wilber Katz, former Professor and Mrs. William Eagle
ton, and Assistant Dean Ratcliffe.
In June, the Class of 1942 held its Silver

Anniversary

Reunion Dinner

Hotel. The

at

the

Sheraton-Chicago

Reunion Committee included Herbert Lesser, Chairman,
Lorenz Koerber, Gerald Scott Moro and Joseph Stein.

Professor Sheldon Tefft was the special guest of the Class.
Ronald 1. Aronberg, C. Curtis Everett and Richard
Hansen made up the Committee for the Tenth Anniver
sary Reunion of the Class of 1957. As with the Class of
1932, the evening began with a tour of the Law Build
ings; the guide in this case was Professor Dallin H. Oaks,
who is a member of the Class. Cocktails and dinner at the
Center for Continuing Education followed. Professor
Kenneth W. Dam, like Professor Oaks, a member of the

Class, presided.

At dinner

the 40th

Anniversary Reunion of the Class
Irving H. Goldberg, foreground, and,
clockwise from Mr. Goldberg, Mr. and Mrs. Owen Johnson
(Mrs. Johnson was Marjorie Carroll), Harold Christianson, Mr.

amused him,

and Mrs. Edwin Podewell and Mr. and Mrs. Lester Reinwald.

Bogert.

of 1927

are

during

Mr. and Mrs.

Assistant Dean

Ratcliffe's after-dinner remarks

depressed

Miss Brennwasser and

seem

annoyed

to

have

Professor
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speaker's table for the Class of 1927 Reunion Dinner were,
right, Mrs. George G. Bogert, Maurice A. Rosenthal, '27,

Mrs. Phil C. Neal and Dean Neal.

Professor Bogert and Rhea Brenwasser,

JD'27.

Dean

Neal, with Paul

Barrett and

Meyer J. Myer, of the Class of

1927.

Professor George Bogert,

front

row

center,

joins twenty-seven members

of the Class of 1927

at

the 40th Reunion of that Class last June.
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The Annual Dinner
The Honorable Ramsey Clark, JD'Sl, Attorney General
of the United States, was the featured
speaker at the
Annual Dinner of the Law Alumni Association on June
1. Dean Neal also spoke briefly. Peter N. Todhunter,

JD'37, President of the Association, presided. J. L. Fox,
JD'47, was Chairman of the Dinner Committee. Officers
and Directors of the Association, including those elected
at the Annual
Meeting, are as follows:
PETER N. TODHUNTER '37
President
CHARLES W. BOAND '33
Vice President
WILLIAM G. BURNS '31
Vice President
J. GORDON HENRY '41
Vice President

J

RICHARD H. LEVIN '37
Vice President
JAMES J. MCCLURE '49

Secretary
ARNOLD 1. SHURE '29

Treasurer

F.

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Terms Expiring in 1969

ROBERT McDOUGAL, JR. '29

JEAN ALLARD '53

Chicago

Chicago

RICHARD F. BABCOCK '46

NORMAN H. NACHMAN '32

Chicago
HON.

Chicago

JACOB M. BRAUDE '20

BERNARD NATH '21

Chicago
LEO

J.

Chicago

CARLIN '19

ALEXANDER L. POLIKOFF '53

Chicago
JEROME

F.

Chicago

DIXON, JR. '60

HERBERT PORTES '36

Chicago

Chicago

JOHN A. ECKLER '39
Columbus, Ohio

MAURICE A. ROSENTHAL '27

A. DANIEL FELDMAN '55

CHARLES F. Russ, JR. '51
Detroit
EDWARD W. SAUNDERS' 4 2

Chicago

Chicago
MILDRED G. GIESE '49

Chicago
L.

Chicago
JOHN D. SCHWARTZ '50
Chicago

JULIAN HARRIS '24

Chicago
E. HOUSTON HARSHA '40

MILTON 1. SHADUR '49

Chicago

Mr. and Mrs. William

Chicago

SIDNEY J. HESS, JR.

'32

Johnson, JD'65,

EARL F. SIMMONS '35

Chicago

at

the

Zolla, JD'65, and Mr. and Mrs. C. Richard
reception preceding the Annual Dinner.

Chicago

DANIEL P. KEARNEY '65

MARVIN T. TEPPERMAN '49
San Francisco
ERWIN TOMASCHOFF '61

Chicago
MORRIS 1. LEIBMAN '33

Chicago,

Chicago

RICHARD H. LEVIN '37
KENT V. LUKINGBEAL '42

LOWELL C. WADMOND '24
New York
PAUL J. WISNER '63

New York
FRANK D. MAYER'23

HARRY N. WYATT '21

Chicago

Chicago

Chicago
EDWARD D.

Raymond Marks, JD'52, Harry Golter, JD'52, and the Honor
Judge of the U. S. District Court.

able Richard B. Austin, JD'26,

Chicago
McDOUGAL, JR. '23

Chicago

DONALD J. YELLON '48

Chicago
DUDLEY A. ZINKE' 42
San Francisco

Terms
RONALD

J. ARONBERG '57

Chicago
FRED C. ASH '40

Chicago

Expiring in

1968

CHARLES W. BOAND '33

Chicago
STUART B. BRADLEY '30
Edward D.

Chicago
(Continued

Committee,
on

next

page)

McDougal, Jr., JD'23, Chairman of the Nominating
Boand, JD'33, Vice President of the

and Charles W.

Alumni Association.
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(Continued from previous page)
WILLIAM G. BURNS '31

JAMES J. MCCLURE, JR. '49

LAURENCE A. CARTON '47

Chicago
DONALD E. EGAN '61

Chicago

Chicago
MORRIS E. FEIWELL '15

THOMAS R. MULROY '28

Chicago

Chicago

THOMAS L. NICHOLSON '55

J. L. Fox '47
DWIGHT P. GREEN '12

ALAN R. ORSCHEL '64

Chicago

Chicago
ANDREW C. HAMILTON '28

HARDING, III '43

Chicago

Chicago
GEORGE C. HOFFMANN '28
Springfield, Ill.
MAURICE H. JACOBS '52
ROBERT N. KHARASCH '51

Wichita

FREDERICK

SASS, JR. '32

Washington
ARNOLD I. SHURE '29

Chicago

Chicago
PAUL R. KITCH '35

PRYOR '10

Iowa
MAURICE ROSENFIELD '38

GORDON HENRY '41

Washington

JOHN C.

Burlington,

Chicago
J.

KEITH I. PARSONS '37

Chicago

Chicago

Chicago
Presidents

of Regional Associations
of the Board Ex Officio

Who Are Members
WILLIAM H. ABBOTT '28

PAUL R. KITCH '35

Paul
GENE B. BRANDZEL '61
Seattle
R. GUY CARTER '30
Dallas
FRANK H. DETWEILER '31
New York
DANIEL FOGEL '49
Los Angeles
LEON B. GABINET '53
Portland, Ore.

Wichita

Minneapolis-St.

Chicago

Chicago

CHARLES F.

DONALD C. McKINLAY '40
Denver
ABNER J. MIKVA '51

EDWIN L. WEISL '19
New York
HON. HUBERT L. WILL '37

JEROME S. WEISS '30

Chicago

Chicago

Chicago

FRED H. MANDEL '29

Cleveland

JAMES P.

MARKHAM '22

Houston
DONALD C. McKINLAY '40
Denver
GEORGE MIRON '56

Washington
DONALD B. SMITH '32
Minneapolis-St. Paul

EDWIN P WILEY '52
•

Milwaukee

PETER N. TODHUNTER '37

Chicago
BERNARD WEISBERG '52

Chicago

President Todhunter addresses the Annual Dinner of the Law Alumni Association.
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Judicial Activism, Nonjudicial
Passivism, and Law Reform
By

PHIL C. NEAL

Dean and

The

Professor of Law,
University of Chicago Law School

Dean Neal was the luncheon speaker at the Ninety-Fourth Annual
Meeting of the Chicago Bar Association. This article is based on
the talk he gave on that occasion, and is reprinted from the
Chicago Bar Record, Volume XLVII, Number 8, June-July, 1967.

The judiciary and the Attorney General. Left to right: The Hon
orable Julius Hoffman, the Honorable A. L. Marovitz, the Honor
able Hubert L. Will, JD'37, and the Honorable James B. Parsons,

JD'49. All

are

judges of the United

States District Court.

I am delighted to have the
privilege of making this
maiden appearance before the annual luncheon of our
Association. I am pleased to be here, but I also feel some

of apology and regret that my own work these
several
past
years has not involved me more frequently
and actively in the affairs of this Association, whose work
I have come to admire very much.
been a mem
sense

Having

ber of the Illinois bar, though an inactive and
mostly
absent one, for nearly twenty-five years, I have a feeling
of kinship that goes a good deal deeper than my rela

tively

recent

Law School.

association with the

My

University

law school and the

organized bar should
am
happy that there is

substantial,

Dean Neal

speaking to the Annual Dinner. Seated, left to right:
Keith I. Parsons, JD'37, General Chairman of the 14th Annual
Fund Campaign, Attorney General Clark, JD'51, and Peter N.
Todhunter, JD'37, President of the Law Alumni Association.

of

Chicago

conviction is that the ties between

a

be dose and

and I
much in the
and
past
present tradition of my law school to affirm
the value of such ties, including the
participation of a
number of members of my faculty in the work of

impor

committees of this Association and the
bership of one of them on our Board of
tant

recent mem

Managers.

I shall

say a few words on the ancient prob
lem of law reform and its relation to the
legal profession,
a

venture to

problem

that

perhaps more than any other bridges the
SCh90ls and the practicing bar. My

interests of the law

for talking about such a well-worn theme is not
that I have new ideas but rather that old ones may have
a timeliness that is like!
y to be neglected for the very
reason that
they are so familiar.
excuse

Fund Chairman Parsons:
and fast!"

"$160,OOO?".

Dean Neal: "At least

There is some impertinence about a
representative of
the law schools speaking to this Association about the role
of the legal profession in law reform. The law schools
have not, I think, been prime movers in the field of law
reform in this country. Their main strengths have been
in other ways. On the other hand, the record of bar
associations such as this one is studded with important

To take only our recent history, one
thinks of such major achievements as the new judicial
article in Illinois, our new Criminal Code and Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the new Illinois Antitrust Act.'
Members of law faculties in this state have had a large
hand in such work, I am happy to say, but the credit for
initiating and pushing through these major changes in

accomplishments'.

The Honorable

Jacob M. Braude, JD'20, with Mr. and Mrs.
Schimberg, JD'52 and Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe,
JD'50, at the Annual Dinner. Judge Braude had just been notified
that he was to receive the distinguished public service citation of
the University of Chicago Alumni Association.
A. Bruce

law, and a good many others that could be listed,
belongs much more to the practicing than to the academic
side of our profession.

our

(Continued

on

page

18)
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Graduates and Honors
Each year, at the time of the Spring Convocation, the
Law School holds a luncheon in honor of its graduating
students, their relatives and friends. In June, 1967, the
customary

toast to

the

was offered by Norval
of
Law and Criminol
Professor

graduates

Morris, Julius Kreeger

ogy. The response on behalf of the graduating class came
from Don S. Samuelson, President of the Class of 1967.

Dean Neal announced the award of honors and
to

the students listed below.

interest

to

the

reader,

we

(Thinking

have added the

prizes

might be of
first job affilia

it

tion of each student

concerned.)
Joseph Henry Beale Prize, for the best work in the
first-year tutorial program-John R. Labovitz, Class' of
The

1969

The Karl

Llewellyn Cup,

and oral argument in the

for excellence in brief

second-year

writing

moot court com

F. Jacobs, Jr., Class of 1968, and Fred
(Assistant Professor of Law, University of

petition-William
L. Morrison

Iowa)
Journal Award, for excellence in the
corporation law-Franklin E. Zimring (Assistant
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School)
The Lawyers Title Award, for excellence in the field
of real property-John T. Gaubatz, (Dawson, Nagle,
Sherman and Howard; Denver)
The United States Law Week Award, to the student
The Wall Street

field of

Zimring, JD'67, now Assistant Professor of Law at
the Law School, was, by virtue of ranking first in the graduating
class, the principal speaker at the Graduate's Luncheon.
Franklin E.

making the most satisfactory scholastic progress in his
final year in the Law School-James N. Williams, Jr.
(Wyatt, Grattan and Sloss; Louisville)
Jackson Prize, for the best paper in the
Constitutional Law-Joseph I. Bentley, Class

The Robert H.
Seminar

on

of 1968
The Ed win F. Mandel A ward, for the outstanding con
to the work of the Legal Aid program-Donald

tribution

G. Alexander

(National League of Cities; Washington)
Competition Awards, to the
winners of, and the team finishing second in, the third
year moot court competition-First, John R. Beard (Law
Offices of D. J. Pree, Anchorage, Alaska), and Thomas
A. Gottschalk (JAG Corps, U.S. Army}; Second, Frank
M. Cook (Clerk to Hon. W. E. Steckler, U.S.D.C.,
Indianapolis) and Don S. Samuelson (Kirkland, Ellis,
Hodson, Chaffetz and Masters; Chicago)
The Hinton Moot Court

The Order of the Coif, members of which are elected
each year from the ten per cent of the graduating class

ranking highest

in

scholarship(Office of

Charles D. Anderson
of the Air

Dye (Parker School,

Columbia

University)
Eglit (Teaching Fellow, University of
Michigan Law School)
George P. Fellemen (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton
and Garrison; New York)
John T. Gaubatz (Dawson, Nagle, Sherman and
Howard; Denver)
Alvin J. Geske (Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell
and Miller; Dallas)
Charles C. Marson (Cooley, Crowley, Gaither, God
ward, Castro and Huddleson; San Francisco)
Gary H. Palm (Schiff, Hardin, Waite, Dorschel and
Britton)
John Henry Schlegl (Teaching Fellow, Stanford Uni
versity Law School)
J. Schneiderman
Zimring (Assistant Professor, The Univerof
sity
Chicago Law School)
The degree of Doctor of Law, cum laude) is awarded to
those students who complete their work for the J.D.
Rebecca

Franklin E.

the General Counsel

Force)
(Assistant Professor of Law, Univer
of
Texas)
sity
Edwin S. Brown (Chapman and Cutler; Chicago)
Charles R. Bush (Graduate Student in History, Uni
versity of California; Berkeley)

Vincent A. Blasi

Gene E.

Howard C.

degree

with

a

weighted grade

average of 78

or

more

Charles D. Anderson, Vincent A. Blasi, Gene E. Dye,
Alvin J. Geske, Fred L. Morrison, Geoffrey Palmer (a
Commonwealth

Fellow)

and Franklin E.

Zimring.
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At the luncheon for graduating students, John O.
Levinson, '40,
and his daughter Elinor, JD'67, are greeted
by Sheldon Tefft,
James Parker Hall Professor of Law.

seniors.

The Hinton Moot Court Committee for 1966-67

was composed of
Ostroff, John C. Hoyle, Philip N. Hablutzel, John T.
Gaubatz, Chairman, John R. Beard, Frank M. Cook, Geoffrey A.
Braun, Robert M. Levin and Jeffrey H. Haas.

Peter 1.

Don S.
a

Samuelson, President of the Class of 1967, responds with
the Faculty.

toast to

Among the graduate students enrolled in the School during the
academic year 1966-67 were, left to right, back row: Bernd Ruster,

The officers of the Edwin F. Mandel

Legal Aid Association for
1966-67, left to right: Philip N. Hablutzel, President, Philip A.
Mason, Secretary-Treasurer, Mrs. Roberta Ramo, 1st Vice Presi
dent, Edward H. Flitton III, 2nd Vice President.

Germany; Kenneth A. Hinnegan, U.S.A.; Mehmet R. Uluc,
Turkey; Junjiro J. Tsubota, Japan; Otto Praschma, Germany;
Djurica O. Krstic, Yugoslavia; and Robert J. Coleman, Great
Britain; middle row: Yean Hi Lee, Korea; Claus D. Meinhardt,
Germany; Hans P. Lundgaard, Norway; Frans F. V. H. Van
Hoeck, Belgium; Yves de Richemont, France; and Viktor Muel
ler, Switzerland; front row: Wolfgang O. Ohndorf, Germany;
Philippe Dupre, France; David Libai, Israel; Nitza S. Libai,
Israel; Marie-Dominique Dupre, France; Radha K. Pillai, India;
and Gerhard Fischer, Germany.

The Law School Record

16

Among the members of the Board of the
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Law Student Association

in 1966-67 were, left to right, front row: Philip W. Getts, A.B.,
Princeton University, Heathcote W. Wales, A. B., University of

Levine, A.B., Duke University; Peter J.
Levin, A.B., Brown University; and Don S. Samuelson, A.B.,
Dartmouth College, President. Back row: Edward M. Zachary,
A.B., Colgate University; Joel H. Kaplan, A.B., Cornell Univer
sity; Phillip M. Steans, A.B., Ripon College; C: Nicholas Vogel,
A.B., Lawrence University; Morris G. Dyner, A.B., The Univer
sity of Chicago; Joel M. Bernstein, A.B., University of Michigan;
Lee F. Benton, A.B., Oberlin College; and Charles E. Murphy,
S.B., Tulane University.
North Carolina; Jane R.

Rockefeller Memorial
abou t

to

Chapel,

as

Convocation

ceremonies

were

begin.

The Unexamined Course Is Not
Worth

Teaching

first-year Tutorial Program, a three-quarter sequence
legal writing and research, was one of the
most important innovations in legal education when it
was introduced
by the University of Chicago Law School
some thirty years ago.
Feeling that innovation is too often allowed to harden
into dogma, the Faculty has decided to reorganize the
Tutorial Program in order to relate it directly to one of
the substantive courses in the first-year curriculum. The
The

of work in

1967-68 Announcements describe the results
"308. TUTORIAL WORK. Each

The Board of Editors of The

University of Chicago

Law Review

1966-67, left to right, back row: Robert M. Krughoff, Vincent
A. Blasi, Elwood T. Olsen, Judson H. Miner, Peter J. Levin, Fred
B. Wei I, and Howard C. Eglit; middle row: Alvin J. Geske,
Edwin S. Brown, C. David Anderson, Laura Banfield, Peter H
Darrow, Charles C. Marson, Comment Editor, and Stanley E.
Ornstein; front row: James G. Hunter, [r., Executive Editor, Neil
K. Komesar, Comment Editor, George P. Felleman, Editor-in
Chief, Franklin E. Zimring, Article and Book Review Editor,
and Charles R. Bush, Article and Book Review Editor.
for

..

as

follows:

student is

first-year
assigned to a tutor for individual and small-group work
in legal analysis, research, and exposition, including an
exercise in brief-writing and oral argument. During the
Autumn and Winter

wi-th the

grated
that course.)
302.

the

course

CONTRACTS

discussion

in Contracts

....

the

course

(see description

of

will be linked with

Program. Weekly lectures by the
Gilmore) will be followed by
classes which will be conducted by the Bigelow
Tutorial

first-year
(Professor

instructor

Quarters the work will be inte

Grant
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Fellows. For these discussion classes, the first-year class
will be divided into ten groups of
approximately fifteen

Taxes

Bigelow Teaching Fellows
working with Professors

Currie in 1967-68
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to

and Collect

Lay

Incomes

.

.

."

The Ann ual Federal Tax Conference of the U ni
versity

of

Chicago Law School has become as inevitable as its
subject matter. This October, for the twentieth consecu
tive year, a distinguished group of
speakers spent nearly
three days addressing themselves to a variety of the most
interesting, complex and pervasive problems in the field
of Federal taxation. The Planning Committee for this
year's Conference was chaired by Middleton Miller, Esq.,
of the Chicago firm of Sidley and Austin. Professor Wal

gram."
The

Power

...

students each. Problems introduced in the lectures and
discussions will be assigned as memoranda of law to be
prepared in connection with the first-year writing pro

will be

Law School

and Instructors who
Gilmore and David

are:

JACOBSON, A.B., 1961, J.D., 1963, both from the

of Iowa. Mr. Jacobson was Editor-in-Chief of
the Iowa Law Review. Since his graduation, he has been

University

associated with the San Francisco firm of Bronson, Bron
and McKinnon.

ter

son

the School's

JOSEPH V. KARAGAN IS, A.B., 1963, Michigan State Uni
versity, J.D., 1966, The University of Chicago. During the

gram was as follows:
"Effect of State Court Decisions

past year, Mr. Karaganis has served as law clerk to the
Honorable Hubert Will, JD'37, Judge of the U.S. District

tions"

Chicago

was

a

Managing

Editor of The

representatives

on

were

the Committee. The pro
on

Federal Tax Ques

DARRELL D. WILES, Lewis, Rice, Tucker, Allan and
Chubb; St. Louis
"The Commissioner's Inquisitorial Powers"
JULES RITHOLZ, Kostelanetz and Ritholz; New York
"The Unrelated Business Income Tax:
Changes Affect

Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
NEIL K. KOMESAR received his A.B. in 1963, M.A. in
1964, and J.D. in 1967, all from The University of Chi
cago. He

J. Blum and Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe

University of

Law Review.

ing Journal

ROBIN

Advertising

Revenues

and

Exhibition

POTTS, of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Staffordshire,
England, received his B.A. in 1966 and B.C.L. in 1967,

Rentals"

both from Oxford

"Additional Consequences of Allocations of Income and

University,

where he

was at

STANLEY S.

Magdalen

College.

at

Law; New York

Deductions among Related Taxpayers"
PAUL FARBER, S. D. Leidesdorf and
Company; New York
"United States Taxation of Foreign Income of Ameri

CHRISTOPHER J. O'H. TOBIN, of Wellington, New Zea
land, is a part-time lecturer in commercial law at the
University of Wellington, and a member of the Welling

cans"

law firm of Chapman, Tripp and Company. Mr.
Tobin was awarded the LL.M. by Canterbury College

RICHARD A.

ton

in

WEITHORN, Attorney

HOEFS, Arthur Andersen and Company;

Chicago

1961, and received the B.C.L. from Oxford in 1963.

"United States Taxation of the American Income of

Foreigners"
MARK

H.

Brown and

BERENS, Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney,
Platt; Chicago

"Investment Credit and Depreciation
Effect on Buy and Sell Deals"

Recapture-Their

JOHN A. BERNAUER, Ernst and Ernst; Chicago
"Allocation of Cash Purchase Price among Assets Pur
chased in Bulk"
,

RICHARD E.

MURPHY, JR., McDermott,

Will and

Emery;

Chicago
"Tax Treatment of Professional Fees Related to Asset
Acquisitions and Changes in Business Entities"
HARRY 1. GROSSMAN, Altschuler, Melvoin and Glasser;

Chicago
A panel discussion of the three
topics listed immedi
ately above by WALTER J. BLUM, and Messrs. BERNAUER,
GROSSMAN and MURPHY.

"Reorganization
The

Bigelow Fellows for 1966-67, left to right: Michael G.
Schneiderman, JD'6S, Geoffrey Shaw, Jeffrey Epstein, Harvey
Perlman, Sheldon Roodman, and Peter Heffey.

JAMES

H.

Guidelines Problems"

WILSON, JR., Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan;

Atlanta and
"Section 531

Washington
Problems, Including

the BARDAHL Formula"

GROSSMAN, D'Ancona, Pflaum, Wyatt and

ARTHUR I.

discussion of the above

panel

JOHNSON,

Hopkins,
Chicago:

two

PAUL F.

topics by

Ernst; Chicago: CHARLES W. DAVIS,
Sutter, Owen, Mulroy, Wentz and Davis;
JOSEPH E. TANSILL, Lybrand, Ross Brothers and
Ernst and

Montgomery;

and

Chicago,

Messrs.

GROSSMAN

and

WILSON

Plans, Including Changes Regarding

"Pension

nation, Qualification,
erence

to

and

Integration,

with

Discrimi

Specific

Ref

WINDHORST, JR., Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad

Corporate Re-Adjustments Incident
Corporation 'Going Public'."
Privately
R.
WIMMER, Lord, Bissell and Brook; Chicago
JAMES
"Financing Corporate Expansion through Tax Exempt
Held

NELSON, Chapman and Cutler; Chicago

specific

Court

essentially a resistant force, using con
grudging statutory interpretation
to slow the pace of legal change. This was followed, after
the turnabout of the mid-thirties, by a permissive Court,
Supreme

as

stitutional doctrine and

a

Court that exercised self-restraint in deference

superior lawmaking
legislatures. But in the

(Continued from page 13)

begin

want to

Congress
period we

Warren

to

and the
have

the

state

seen

a

emergence of a Court that is itself
architect of change. In one area of law after another,

an

shift, the

the Court has led and the country has followed.
The change is reflected, of course, in the cliche that

describes the Warren Court

and

with this confession because I

legal

resulted from the Court's decisions, great as some of them
have been. We had the earlier, long-standing image of the

"activist." It is reflected

as

conformity with democratic
also, I think, in the

the Nation's laws into closer

I

of

source

way is more revolution
changes in the law that have
a

in the attitude of sizable segments of the population that
look to the Court as a champion and expect it to bring

Bonds"
DAVID H.

ary than any of the

still further

and Burns; Chicago
"The Tax Effect of
to a

conspicuous

most

in the country. This in

credentials of

HR 10"

GEORGE W.

Court has become the

change

Riskind; Chicago
A
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follow

egalitarian

values. It is reflected

Court's view of itself-in its ways of
practices. One symptom of this is the

that read

like

speaking

and its

growing

number

than

gentle indictment, an indictment that runs
the
legal profession as a whole.
against
The indictment is that the profession, for all its good
work, has not been as powerful an engine of law reform
as we should hope and expect. The indictment is a gentle
one because it is not easy to assign responsibility for this

of

failure. A more intense and constant concern on the part
of the average lawyer would no doubt have made a differ
ence. But some of the causes are to be found in defects

weakening of barriers such as the require
standing and the doctrine of political questions.
Another manifestation of the same tendency is the
Court's increased receptiveness to amicus curiae partici

it with

in

our

a

institutions.

Many types of evidence could be adduced in support
general proposition. I want to dwell for a moment
on one item in
particular that underscores the problem
and its significance. I refer to the Supreme Court and to
the distinctive role that it has come to play in the past
of the

fifteen years.
In speaking of the

ten or

Supreme Court my aim is to be
thought and deed. That is not a wholly

neutral in

word,

congenial

attitude for

whose

special

academic

lawyer, particularly

interests lie in the

of constitu

an

territory
professors thrive mostly
on subtle analysis and the fine art of judicial criticism.
Much of what the Supreme Court has been doing in
recent years seems to have been tearing down the points
one

tionallaw and antitrust law. Law

of reference that made the game fun, and the Court seems
to have become relatively immune to intellectual criti
cism.

Fortunately

the enthusiasm of

this trend has
some

not

altogether

of the critics, such

as

opinions

more

a statute

dates for the

decision,

application

of its

new

commands. Another

is the Court's greater hospitality to issues that transcend
the narrow interests of specific litigants, a tendency re

flected in the

ment

of

pation.
taken

In these and other ways the Court's work has
stronger legislative cast than it has ever had

on a

before.
There is
Court

much need

not

reforming

as a

to

document this view of the

institution.

Major

has accelerated the pace of legal
The obvious and dramatic ones are

tionment, and

state

criminal

in which it

areas

change

are

familiar.

segregation, reappor
procedure. But there are

examples, both constitutional and statutory,
readily to mind. From my own field I
would cite the rapid conversion of the antitrust laws
into a set of rigid per se doctrines, especially but not
exclusively in the field of mergers. The Court has even
moved strongly into the field of private and common
hosts of other

that will

law,
has

as

come

in its

now

doctrines in the law of defamation," It

new

given

the

signal

for

sweeping changes

blunted

cedures and indeed the whole

my col

courts," There

league Philip Kurland.
I am by no means calling for a moratorium on such
criticism or asking for an amnesty on the Court's behalf.
I wish merely to make the objective observation that the

a

and that purport to lay down detailed rules or guidelines
for the future-even to the point of specifying cut-off

procedure

are

it may

philosophy

in the pro

of

juevnile

intimations that in the field of criminal
move on

from

problems

of self-incrimi

right
imposing constitutional
of
requirements
pre-trial discovery." The expanding con
of
state
action
has become a quite open-ended warcept
nation and

to

counsel

to
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rant

left

The

University of Chicago

for intervention in new areas of the law previously
the states, as in the Court's recent decision forbid

believed it

California

to

its

repeal

fair-housing

law

by

ing

in

for

a

at a

time when

is very much in

judicial

lawmak

It has been obvious

general
eclipse.
long time that the creative era of the common law
is a thing of the past and that legislation has become the
dominant form of law. The steady trend toward as
cendancy of statute law over judge-made law has not
abated. The explanation of the paradox, of course, lies in
the fact that the Federal Constitution is the principal
remaining source of judicial power to make new law. We
have had

a
Supreme Court that has exercised that power
bold fashion.
There are some obvious reasons for doubting that a
system is ideal when it leaves heavy responsibility for
initiating legal development in a court whose chief power
comes from
having the last word on what the Constitu
tion means. Heavy involvement of the Court in great
political problems is only one of the dangers. Another
is the irrevocability of changes that are made under the
auspices of the Constitution. In the face of the rapid de
velopment of constitutional doctrine, efforts like that of
the American Law Institute and the American Bar Asso
ciation to deal painstakingly with the problem of criminal
procedure, and of Congress to lay down standards for
legislative apportionment, have more than the irony of
locking the barn door after the horse is gone; the prob
lem is how to re-open the barn.
As lawyers, however, we must be interested not merely
in observing this shift in the balance of lawmaking
power, and in criticizing or deploring the Court's tenden
cies, but in trying to understand the forces that have
brought it about. It seems improbable that we can ac
count for it solely as the
product of the particular person
alities that circumstance has placed on the Court, or that

in

a.

it is

likely

I have

no

to

be

drastically changed by new appointments.
attempting to give a full account

intention of

of those forces

even

if I

were

able

to

do so,

as

I

am not.

But I suggest that the current position of the Supreme
Court is among other things a reflection of an older prob

lem and

There

an

older defect in

our

legal machinery.

different ways of viewing the Court's recent
behavior. It is possible to think of the Court as a group
of adventurous knights charging off to discover new
causes and do battle. Another and more charitable view
is that the Court has felt itself responsible for overcoming
are

of the

lag in the response of our law to new pres
and conditions, compensating for the inertia of
other agencies in the system. I have little doubt that the
Court has often seen itself in the latter role, and has
some
sures

assuming

initiatives forced upon it by the
has been its position on

clearly

the great
tionment.

a

constitutional referendum (one-man, one-vote notwith
standing) .5
The fact that so much initiative in legal change has
passed to the Supreme Court is in a sense paradoxical
because it has occurred

was

19

default of others. That

to

ding

Law School

'

problems of school segregation and reappor
Very likely a similar defense could be advanced
for it in a good many other areas as well. (No doubt the
Court found more than poetic justification for its long
expected miscegenation decision in the case this Term
that originated under the compelling caption of Virginia
against Loving.") The wide acceptance of Gideon v.
Wainwright, for example, suggests that the bar was
merely waiting to be formally advised of a responsibility
that it had come instinctively to recognize in the many
years since the Court had taken the first steps toward
implementing the right to counsel in criminal cases.

The

new

the need for

position of

the

Supreme

Court

emphasizes

renewed attention to the efficiency of
our arrangements for legal
development. Where else
besides the Constitution and the Supreme Court should
we look for constant and
vigorous attention to the whole
some

spectrum of issues of law reform? The issues that the
Court can lay its hands on are of course only part of the
problem, and a tiny fragment at that. If there is lag in
response on problems of the kind the Supreme Court
has been considering, what of the vast areas of the law
our

that get little public notice, that have little political ap
peal, and that find no special interest groups to urge

their reform?
Over a hundred years ago de
observation:

made this

Tocqueville

"The Americans, who have made so many innovations
political laws, have introduced very sparing altera
tions in their civil laws, and that with great difficulty,
in their

although

many of these laws are repugnant to their social
reason for this is that in matters of civil

condition. The
law the

majority are obliged
legal profession, and the
clined to innovate when they
the

to

defer

the authority of
lawyers are disin

to

American

are left to their own choice.
Frenchman to hear the complaints
that are made in the United States against the stationary
spirit of legal men and their prejudices in favor of existing
institutions."?

"It is curious for

a

Those

charges would be hard to sustain today against the
total record of law reform in this country, for a good deal
of which the bar and agencies of the bar have been re
sponsible.

But

criticism that a student
have
made
then and might still
government might
make is that we have not built into the system any mecha
nism specifically charged with perfecting and remodeling
our laws. And of course the need for it is much
greater
now than then.

of

a

more

accurate

our

Much has been
American Law

done, to be sure, by groups such as the
Institute, the Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws, committees of national and local bar associa
tions, rules committees, and innumerable special com
mittees and commissions created from time

the

legislatures

to

and the executive branches of

time
state

by

and
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local governments. The law schools, too, have made their
contribution. But most of such work is ad hoc and
sporadic. Often it is directed to problems that have al
ready become urgent by the time they are given attention.
Much of it focuses on a few selected areas that seem
appropriate for a major project. Our law reform machin
ery works in a jerky and uneven way. It also works for
the most part with casual or part-time interest and help.
The legislatures, while theoretically responsible, cannot
be relied on to give continuous and careful attention to
improving the laws. They too operate largely in response
to specific pressures. Besides they are heavily
preoccupied
with taxing and spending, and with current controversies.
These are old complaints, and they led long ago to
constructive proposals for remedying them. The case for
some
permanent machinery for law reform was made
early in the nineteenth century by Bentham and
Brougham in England and early in this century by
Cardozo and Pound in the United States. For the most
part such proposals have failed to command wide public
interest, or to arouse the professional support necessary
to overcome

inertia. A few

New York and

California,

states in this country,
notably
have succeeded in establishing

law revision commissions, with results that have been
widely praised in those states. The idea is not a new one
in

our

own

state.

Twenty

suasive article"

by

Heineman, led

to a

a

careful and per
Mr. Ben

a

years ago

young

Chicago lawyer,

that had the support of this
to receive the
blessing of the legislature. (I suppose we might infer that
Mr. Heineman concluded this was not the way to run a

proposal

Association but that nevertheless failed
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It would share the field with them and would draw upon
existing resources for advice and assistance in its

these
own

projects.

tive

use

of

It could do

sources

of.

great deal
help that are
a

uncoordinated, including
law students. Much

make

more effec
scattered and
members of law faculties and

to

now

come from divert
law reviews that
the
ing
now goes into refined criticism of the
judges' work and
it
instead
into
and
research
turning
drafting on legislative

even

good might

of the student talent

some

on

We have

recently had an encouraging experi
School, in a seminar directed by
Professor Julian Levi which collaborated with the Legis
lative Commission on Low Income Housing, chaired by
Representative Robert E. Mann.'!

problems.
ment

of that

sort at our

The aim should be to create a small commission com
posed of men of great professional stature who are pre
to

devote

to

its work-and who would be

of their time,

preferably full
time,
compensated ac
is
There
obvious
merit
in
cordingly.
Judge Friendly's
suggestion that some of the talent might well be found
in retired judges and in senior lawyers who have reached
the point where the opportunity to make a lasting contri
bution to the law may have greater appeal than further
in practice. Appointment to the commission
success
should be invested if possible with prestige rivaling that
of membership on a high court. There should be close
links with the legislature, presumably through ex officio
membership of leaders of the judiciary committees. But
the legislature ought not to look upon the commission as
pared

a

major part

There are signs now of a revival of attention to this
sensible and rather obvious step for getting a better grip
on the
problem of law reform. Not long ago Judge

a rival but as an aid. The success of the commission
would depend not upon authority but on the quality of
its work and the wisdom of its recommendations.
The potential field of effort of such a commission
would be broad. A substantial part of its work would be
a kind of
legal gardening that is now no one's special

Henry Friendly

made a powerful argument calling for
law revision agency in the federal government.9 In
England the experience with a lengthy history of ad hoc

responsibility-keeping

a

weeded, and the leaves raked up. This is unspectacular
but important work; each year's judicial decisions draw

railroad.)

law reform committees has led

ship

of the

manent
set

current

at last, under the leader
Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, to a per

Law Reform Commission. The Commission has

for itself

an

impressive

first

re-examination of various fields of
its work has

agenda for systematic
English law. Some of
in, after

year of
operation, and there seems little reason to doubt that it is
destined to have a profound impact on the law of Eng

already begun

to come

one

land.l"

blueprints

in this idea

as a

commission is

development

is whether the time has
out

of the closet and

progressive

renew

our

take

interest

step for Illinois. A law reform
to take over all the work of

needed, not
law, but

of the

not come to

to

provide

a

steady

source

of

energy and initiative. A commission would not displace
bar committees, committees appointed by the Supreme

Court, and other existing

sources

of law revision work.

trees

pruned,

the

lawns

host of small but

cumulatively significant
points on which intelligent draftsmanship
could clarify the law and eliminate some difficulties. A
second major area of effort would be those more compre
to a

technical

hensive re-examinations of whole fields of the law, like
the drafting of the new Criminal Code, that are necessary
from time

to

date and in
But it is

My question
old

attention

the

time if the

statute

book is

to

be

kept

up

to

order.

good working
be hoped that the

charter of such a commis
with
these
kinds of techni
traditional
stop
cal law revision. It is in this respect that I think Illinois
has an opportunity to press beyond the existing models of
sion would

to

not

law revision commissions in this country. Such a commis
encouraged to take a broad view and a

sion should be

view. No area of the law or of our legal machinery
should be barred from its field of interest. It would, of
course, be expected to move modestly and cautiously at

long
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The

University of Chicago

the beginning. It should establish a solid basis for confi
dence in its work by superior craftsmanship in technical
and noncontroversial parts of the law. But it should not
be too modest. It should hope to become in time a source
of

and

perspective

wisdom, and

of bold

even

proposals,

reforms in the law that may take a long time in com
ing and that may require the kind of perseverance that
led to the new Judicial Article. It should
expect to pro
duce not only proposed legislation of matters
appropriate
for immediate action, but thoughtful
reports on emerging
problems that may not yet be ripe for final recommenda
tions. It should aim to inform, and to elicit wide interest
and debate, not only among the members of the

21

10.

See PROPOSALS FOR ENGLISH AND SCOTTISH LAW
COMMISSIONS, Cmnd.
2573 (H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1965); THE LAW COMMIS
SION, FIRST ANNUAL REP. 1965-66 (H.M. Stationery Office, London,

11.

See

1966).

12.

on

profes
public at large. We should judge its
success not
solely by its batting average in each session
of the legislature, but by the extent to which it builds a

Law School

FOR BETTER HOUSING IN ILLINOIS,
Report of the Legislative Com
mission on Low Income Housing, 75th General Assembly (1967).
An excellent example of the kind of study that is needed in
many
areas is the admirable
report on Illinois antitrust law prepared by a
committee of the Association under the chairmanship of Robert W.

Bergstrom, Esq., which laid the basis for a new and greatly im
proved state antitrust statute. THE LAW OF COMPETITION IN ILLINOIS,
A Study by the Special Subcommittee on Illinois Antitrust Laws of
the Chicago Bar Association (u. OF ILLINOIS LEGAL SERIES,
1962).
13.

See also note 1, supra.
Scarman, The Role of the Legal Profession in Law Reform, 21 THE
RECORD, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 11, 16 (1966).

sion but also in the

record of reasoned statements that can constitute a foun
dation for the progressive development of the lawP
As Sir Leslie Scarman, the chairman of the
English
Law Commission, has reminded us, law reform is in
many respects

profession.

too

The

serious

matter to

a

profession

be

must

aggerate its claim of competence

be left

on

to

guard

the

legal

society.

But

In Sir Leslie's

our

to

society

words, "The real

for the

for law reform and
is whether we as profes
test

legal profession
prepared to lay our hands to the reform
of questions of law which profoundly affect interests
of great importance to society."13
It would be good to be able to believe that the old
...

sional

...

men are

suggestion of a Law Reform Commission is an idea
whose time has come. Surely there is no
project with
of
benefit
to
our
greater promise
lasting
legal system
that an association such as ours might seek to advance.
I think I can assure you that in
any such effort this
Association would have the warm support and coopera
tion of the law schools and the academic
lawyers of this
State.
FOOTNOTES
1.

See 48

2.

E.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

3.

4.

CHIC�GO BAR RECORD

140

law

(1967).

See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74, 98 (1967); cf. the recent
proposals of the New Jersey Judicial Conference, N.Y. Times, May
4, 1967, p. 28, col. 4.
5. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. DEMOCRACY IN 'AMERICA, Vol. 1, P. 290
(Bradley, ed., Vintage
Books, 1960).
8. A Law Revision Commission for Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REV. 697
(1948). For a bibliography on the subject, see 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 377
(1966).
9. The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963), reprinted in FRIENDLY,
BENCHMARKS, ch. 4 (U. of Chicago Press, 1967).

more

page

6)

directly.

But all the studies

on

which this essay will report have

thing in common: they were made for the purpose of
being used by the law and in many instances have af
one

fected its course,"
We shall report these studies in the order of the
spec
that ranges from the narrowly but sharply focused

not to ex

decide what is good
has been in the habit of look
ing to lawyers for guidance. I am sure we believe that
the habit should be encouraged and the faith vindicated.
for

(Continued from

trum

controlled experiment to
Controlled Experiment
There is

no more

the

powerful

broad, diffuse

tool for

assessing

survey.

a

legal

inno

any innovation for that matter, than the con
trolled experiment. But since its essence is to apply a rule
of law to one group of cases and to withhold it from

vation,

or

another, such purposeful discrimination would
first

violate the

seem

at

guaranty of the Con
stitution." Indeed, there are substantive limits to legal
experimentation; there can be none that involves with
holding of a right, guaranteed under all circumstances.
It would be impossible, for instance, to insist that some
criminal defendants be tried without counsel in order to
find out what effect counsel has. But there are several
to

equal protection

outside this

reasons

why,

should

permit experimentation. First,

discrimination is
discrimination is

rigidly protected sphere, the law
the experimental

by definition temporary; second, the
applied impartially, by lot; third it is
the very purpose of the experiment to learn what, if
any,
effect the discriminating rule would have: hence, at the
outset,

one

cannot even

be certain that there is discrimi

nation; and fourth, the ultimate aim of the experiment is
to

eliminate the rule if it should be found

to

discriminate

unfairly.
Controlled legal experiments, not surprisingly, have
been confined to rules that convey
privileges
rather than rights.
The first controlled experiments within the
precincts
of the law were probably conducted by the Adult Prison

largely

of the State of California, which tried to assess
the effectiveness of a variety of prisoner treatments. The
most daring of these
experiments was an effort to deter-

Authority

22
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mine what

happened if prisoners were released nine
appointed time; specifically, whether
a
release
was
premature
likely to increase the rate of
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Table 4-1.

months before their
such

CONTROL GROUP:

EXPERIMENTAL

OBLIGATORY

GROUP: OPTIONAL

PRETRIAL

PRETRIAL

recidi vism. 6

Not much

of these

came

because the recidivism

experiments, partly perhaps
is

rate

brittle

too

measure

a

statistics,

being caught,

are on

revealed

as

the average about

by

the

in

five, this ratio

one

published

well have a great variance and hence be
unstable measure,"

might

A controlled
urement

and had

conducted in the
In

of

most

before

they

that allowed of

experiment

immediate effect

an

state courts

our

come

courts

precise

very

meas

the law

on

was

Jersey.

or

are

become known as pretrial. There, counsel for both sides,
occasionally with their clients, meet with the judge to
and air the

present briefly the issues under dispute
bilities of settlement. Tradition has it that these
aside from

preparing

increase the

of

means

reducing

congestion

facilitating

of settlements

of

prior

the
to

been considered

has, therefore,

tion

able

rate

and

the trial load and

metropolitan

our

possi

pretrials,
subsequent trial,

trial. The institu

desirable

most

a

thereby
courts.

the intoler
Since many

cases, the trial of which would have lasted two

days

the average, are settled during a half-hour pretrial
ference, this notion seemed well supported.
But

of available statistics made the

analysis

doubtful; there

were

indications that the

con

point
at

would have been settled also without it and
that the court time spent on pretrying cases might be
wasted. The precise answer, it was suggested, could, come
only from a controlled experiment which pretried a ran

pretrial

omitted

dom sample of cases and
parable control group,"
At that time the New

made

Chief

pretrial obligatory,
Justice

sympathetic

to

III

a

Justice

Jersey

courts

had

and the state's

sweeping effect

criminal

on

the law

was

conducted in the

of Manhattan. It revolutionized

one of
solid traditions in the criminal law : the practice
of setting bail for defendants arraigned in our criminal

the

courts

most

Bail is set, as a matter of constitutional right, for
nearl y all defendants; if they can post it, they are set free;
if not, they must remain in jail. Whether or not they can
post it depends as a rule on the bondsman, who, against
a premium of some 10
per cent, will or will not take the
risk of providing the demanded bail. Only rarely is a
courts.

defendant allowed

to

go free without

posting

rule that

a

distinguished

University,

to

Project
conduct

experiment." The design called for random assign
ment of cases by the clerks of the respective courts to
two alternative procedures: to obligatory pretrial in one
the

group of cases, and to optional pretrial in the control
group, where it would be held only if one or both of the

litigants requested
Accordingly, 2,954
assigned at random alternatingly to the two

cases

were

groups, for

which the settlement ratios shown in Table 4-1

emerged.

bail.

The system has been heavily criticized because it favors
the well-to-do, surrenders the actual decision to the bonds
man, and

jail,

keeps

an

inordinate

of whom

some

are

of defendants

proportion

subsequently acquitted.

The

system, nevertheless, withstood all criticism until the
Vera Foundation made known its findings from a
unique experiment which it conducted in 1961. With the

co-operation of the New York judiciary and the New
York University Law School, all defendants arraigned in
the

felony

assess

court

of Manhattan

the risk of their

court were to

then Director of the

Columbia

it."

by the experiment, the State of New Jersey forthwith
changed its rule and made pretrial optional.l!
But the legal experiment that had the most profound

were

interviewed

to

at

groups: those for whom
could be reasonably recommended
into

so as

failing appear their trial, if the
free them without requiring bail. On the
to

basis of these interviews the defendants

Rosenberg,
at

to

com

and its Court Administrator, becoming
both the query and the proposal, commis

sioned Professor
for Effective

pretrial

78%

was

failed

in

settled

cases

on

76%

no difference. In addition, the experiment
confirm a subsidiary hypothesis, namely, that the
pretried, and hence prepared, cases required a shorter
trial time. Thus the conclusion emerged simple and
clean: contrary to a widely held belief, obligatory pretrial
did not save court time, but in fact wasted it. Persuaded

There

and

all of the civil suits,
scheduled for what has

some

trial,

to

of New

a

they

reached the trial stage

of

effectiveness since, in order to be counted as a recidivist,
it is not sufficient to have committed another crime; it is
also necessary to be caught and reconvicted. And since
the odds of

Suits settled before

two

a

to

were

classified

release without bail
the

court

and those

for whom such a recommendation could not be made.
The recommendable group was then divided into two
random halves: the

recommendation

to

group, for which the
release the defendant without bail

experimental

actually transmitted to the arraignment judge, and
the control group, with respect to which the judge was
told nothing and thereby left to his own traditional mode
of making the bail decision. In this latter group only 14
was

per

cent

against

pothesis

of all defendants

60 per
was

cent

that

which 60 per

at

cent

were

freed without bail,

in the recommended half. The

the time of

trial, from

as

hy

the group of
had been freed without bail, more
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would fail

of

only

to
appear in court than from the group where
14 per cent were free without bail, and the question
how many more? When trial time came, only 1 per

the

of all defendants released without

judges whether they
apply it in the particular case. It was from this
discretion that, seemingly, the difficulties, but eventually
the salvation of the experimental design, arose. If each
judge could apply the rule in some cases and not in

was:

cent

ommended

bail,

whether

rec

purposely failed to appear in court.
The experiment thereby proved that the number of de
fendants released without bail could be quadrupled with
out reducing their
availability at the time of trialP
The results of the experiment were stunning. The
City of New York took over the interviewing from the
or

not,

foundation and established it

permanent service. The'
of the United States convoked a con

Attorney-General

as a

ference

on the
topic, and today almost all major cities
and many rural areas have adopted the Vera procedure,
and with it the liberalized practice of release without bail.
And the Department of Justice left no doubt as to where

the credit

belonged: "Of particular significant is the fact
changes have flowed not out of a crisis
rather from education, through empirical research

that these
but

...

and demonstration.V'"
The

secret

of the

of this

experiment was two
bondsmen, everybody stood

municipal jails

saved

money; the defendants themselves were spared unneces
sary hardships; and last, but not least, the ends of justice

advanced.

experiment

the numerical result of the

Secondly,

was so

The
to

clear that

no

probability

calculus

was

court

had

the rule in

adopted

wanted

others, and if he

only

those

ised

some

cases

were to

select-as in fact he often did

for

trial

split

gain
application, the cases
tried under the split
mode
and
those
regular

trial rule could

be compared. Whatever difference in
be
found between the two could not
length might
be attributed to the new rule, because the cases were ad
mittedly different to begin with.
not

trial

At first

glance

this lack of random

original assignment of cases to
made randomly, the inference
was allowed that the cases
coming before Judge A did
not differ from the cases
coming before Judge B. And
then something fortunate happened. The discretion of
the judges resulted in an effective spread of the experi

judges

mental stimulus:
cases,

some

in

was

some

hardly

used the rule in almost all their

any, and

trial rule saved time, the
more often should
require

If, then,

it

were

than those who
be true,

as

Table 4-2.

true

made

split

to

to

limit evidence and

argument in the first part of the trial to the liability issue,
asking the jury to decide whether the defendant owes
anything at all. Only if this decision is affirmative does
the trial

dict
in

proceed

applied

the
only a little
on

trial
time

more

expected to
normally spent

was

than half of all cases, this mode of
save something like half of the trial
on

damages. The Federal District
was
sufficiently intrigued by

Court for Northern Illinois

this

split-trial

idea

to

try it

out

and

to

ask the

University

propor

on the average less trial time
it less often. This turned out to

Table 4-2 shows.

Proportion of Split

Trials and

Injury

Average

Trial

Cases

PROPORTION

JUDGE

LENGTH OF

OF CASES

ALL TRIALS

NUMBER

TRIED UNDER

BEFORE THIS

OF TRIALS

JUDGE

(DAYS)

JUDGE'*'

(26)
(41)
(26)
(22)
(27)
(14)

A

89

3.2

B

51

3.3

C

38

3.5

D

14

3.8

E

7

3.9

F

7

4.3

*Only judges

BEFORE

SPLIT-RULE

(PER CENT)

with the evidence and

subsequent ver
size of the damages." Since liability is affirmed

varying

AVERAGE

by the defendant, who
After both have had their

turn

the trial and

in

application of the split
judges who applied the rule

Time in Personal

Under traditional trial procedure, the plaintiff in a civil
first presents his case both as to liability and size of

some

that the

case

was

would

Since the

possible.

the individual

Experiment

presents his side of the case.
say, the jury retires and decides whether the defendant
is at all liable for damages and, if so, how large these
damages should be. The question of damages thus be
comes relevant
only if liability is found. The suggestion

assignment

fatal. Yet, while it made the analysis more compli
cated and less powerful, it did in fact make the experi
seem

The Natural

damages

in his view, prom

tried in the

tions between.

and is followed in

which,

in time from the

appreciation.l"

tigator with a natural experiment, that is, with an ex
perimental and a control group that were not purposely
designed by him. Within limitations, this may be quite
satisfactory, as the following case history shows.

form that left it

to

needed for its

Sometimes administrative routine will present the inves

a

effect of

the discretion of the individual

ment

success

fold. First, except for the bail
to gain from the liberalization: the

were

Chicago Law School to help in assessing the
split-trial rule, as it has come to be called.l"

with

more

than 10 trials

are

included.

THIS
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The

regression line based on these data indicated that
point where a judge conducted all trials under the
split-trial rule, his average trial time was about 20 per
cent below the
point where none of the trials were split.
This, then, was the magnitude of the time that could be
saved through application of the rule.
But since the variation in the stimulus was not random,
but self-selected, it was desirable to provide supporting
evidence. It was clear that whatever savings there were
the

at

must

come

The

from the elimination of the

frequency

of

mined both for the

Table

damage
regular

damage

trial.

trials was,

therefore, deter

and for the

split

trials.

(See

4-3.)

Experiment Under
Seminatural Conditions
If

an

Disposition of Regular

and

Split

Trials

REGULAR

SPLIT

TRIALS

TRIALS

(°10 )

(°10 )

76

15

Complete trial on liability
and damages
Trial ended after liability
verdict

58

because verdict

Was

for defendant

because
were

43

damages
settled after

verdict

affirming
liability
Other dispositions
(settlement during
24

two

27

100%

groups of cases were dras
of all regular cases went

dispositions
tically different: 76 per cent
through a complete trial, against only

15 per

cent

of the

separate trials. As for the latter group, 58 per cent were
spared trial of the damage issue because of the inter
mediate verdict denying liability; in 43 per cent of the
the trial

simply ended when liability was denied,
and in another 13 per cent of the cases there was no trial
of the damages because they were settled after the jury
had affirmed liability.
The split trial is a radical innovation in American law,
cases

on

its

the fore

the pressures of court congestion.
study
published, the Joint Committee
Effective Administration of Justice, on suggestion of

brought

to

When the

by

was

constitutionally protected area,
is likely to occur, and a

experiment

jury reaction to certain variations in the law. The natural
element in these experiments was the jurors, summoned

by

a

real trial

the request
on the case

to

judge from the jury pool of his court with
partake in the experiment and to deliberate

as

if it

were a

Anglo-American

real one.l"

law the defense of

insanity has
century in the so-called
M'Naghten rule, which calls for an acquittal if the de
fendant either did not know what he was doing or did
not know that what he was
doing was wrong. Recently,
the rule has come under criticism, primarily from psychi
been embodied for

more

than

a

atrists. In 1954 the Federal Court in the District of Col

umbia established

a new rule in a case in which one
Durham was indicted, and subsequently acquitted, on a
charge of burglary. The Durham rule considers the de
fense as established if the criminal act can be shown to
be the "product of a mental disease or a mental defect."
It became thus a point of major interest for the criminal
law to find out what if any difference it made to the

of

trial whether insanity was defined under
M'Naghten or under the Durham rule.
The "law" in a criminal jury trial becomes operative
a

the

100%

of the

natural

simulated one must suffice. But even then, as many na
tural components as possible must be retained, as for
instance in the following series of experiments concern
ing the defense of insanity. They were designed to test

outcome

trial, directed verdicts)

The

issue falls into the

not even a

In

Table 4-3.

Vol. 15 No.2

first

chairman, United States Supreme Court Justice Clark,
copies sent to all trial judges in the United States;

had

primarily through the judge's instruction to the jury
before it begins deliberation. In that instruction the
judge spells out the circumstances under which the jury
may find the defendant insane. In away, then, the ques
tion as to what difference the law makes means what

difference it makes to the jury whether it is instructed
according to the rule in M'Naghten or in Durham.
To compare the insanity cases in the District of Colum
bia with cases from a court that operates under the

M'Naghten doctrine could provide only unsatisfactory
findings, since not only the rule of law but also the cases,
the juries, and the judges are likely to be different. And
it is obviously impossible to decide the issue through a
controlled experiment under completely natural condi
tions. Therefore, an experiment had to be designed that
combined natural with laboratory conditions, sufficiently
realistic to justify confidence in its validity.
Two trial records were composed: one, a case of house
breaking, a simplified version of the original Durham
trial; the other,

writing, several state and federal courts have
moved to authorize their judges to use the split-trial pro
cedure, and the institution is likely to gain more

an incest case, also an abbreviated version
actual trial. In both trials the accused's only defense
was
insanity. The trial evidence was acted out, with the
other elements of the trial put on recording tape. Of each

ground."

case,

as

of this

of

an

three main variants

were

produced.l"

The tapes

Vol. 15 No.2

The

identical but for that part of the judges instruction
that dealt with the defense of insanity and for the con
comitant psychiatric testimony. In one version the in
struction and

the

psychiatric testimony
second, according

third, the

were

according

instruction left it in

to

to

judgment as to whether the evidence in the case sup
ported a defense of insanity, forcing the jury to establish
its own law of insanity.
Each of the three versions

metropolitan
a hundred
juries.

presented
judge called

A

and asked them

then taken into

was

and

courts

in

turn to more

these

jurors

two

than

into his

co-operate in the

experi
them, they would oblige
the court and also discharge their present turn of jury
duty. The jurors then listened to the taped trial and
courtroom

ment;

by

so

to

he advised

doing,

afterward deliberated and arrived
shows the

jurors'

of the

outcome

vote on

at a

verdict. Table 4-4

of the
the beginning of
in

experiment
prior to

their first ballot,

terms

the deliberation.f"

an hour), and
jury deliberation was
procedure without consequences in the
real world. As to the second point, there was considerable
reassurance: these were real
jurors called to duty by a
real judge; they discharged their responsibilities with
such obvious zeal and honesty that deliberations lasted
up to ten hours, often engendering high-pitched battles
among the jurors who, at times, ended in a "hung jury."
The other point raises a more serious problem. A tape
recording of a trial, condensed to about an hour's length,
may be something quite different from a full-blown trial,
in which the jury not only hears but also sees over a
period of many hours real people with all the significant

clearly

Durham; and in
fact to the jurors own

in the

25

trial condensed into

were

M'Naghten;

Law School

University of Chicago

�

a

mock

details of their reactions. Without additional research,
the point allows of no precise answer.
As to the consequences of the insanity experiments,
this stage only venture a guess. On the whole,
experiment should strengthen the hand of those who
oppose the Durham rule, simply because its message to
one can at

the

the

is

ambiguous. Whatever the shortcomings of
right-wrong test, its criteria are clear and
can be
applied by the jury.
The jury, in spite of its deep constitutional roots, has
been the topic of perennial debate, with little precise
knowledge to support it.
Some years ago, the University of Chicago Law School
began a large-scale study of the jury system, and one of
its key questions was: What difference would it make if
all jury cases were tried only by a judge sitting without a
jury?
jury

the traditional

Table 4-4.

Per Cent

Insane"

DURHAM

57

(264)
76

65

(120)

(120)

(120)

case

34

(312)

(240)

Housebreaking

NO RULE

36

24

case

Guilty

First Ballot

M'NAGHTEN
Incest

"Not

of Jurors Voting

on

trials, the Durham rule elicited a higher per
acquitals by reason of insanity than the
M'Naghten rule, That the percentages under Durham
In both

centage of

very close to those obtained under the "No Rule"
instruction suggests, furthermore, as indeed it has been
are

argued,21 that Durham comes close to being no rule.
The figures show that the incest case allowed a sharper
differentiation between M'Naghten and Durham than
the housebreaking case. This difference is instructive
beyond the specific issue. The defendant in the incest
case was an officer in a
city's fire department, with an
excellent record, who, except for the crime in question,
had never shown any signs of abnormality. The de
fendant in the

like the

burglary

case,

original Durham,

on

the other hand, much

had been in and

out

of mental

institutions and hence had

shown, by whatever legal or
common-sense rule,
signs of insanity. The fireman could
be found insane only if the jury was instructed (as Dur
ham
tom

allows)
of

The

to

consider the criminal

act

itself

as a

symp

insanity.
experiment

to

the

question would seem to demand a controlled ex
periment-every case to be tried twice, once with and
once without a
jury-an obviously impossible solution.
Equally impossible it would be to assign cases at random
to jury and judge, since this is a choice no defendant
must be deprived of. Nor would the
simple comparison
of actual jury verdicts with actual judge verdicts help,
if limited

even
we

to

know that the

trials of the
cases

same

raised

two

questions

of

general signifi

type of crime, because

in which the defendant waives

a

quite different from those where he wants one.
Curiously enough, the design eventually adopted for
the study came close to the ideal design, the controlled
jury

are

A nationwide

sample of trial judges reported
specified
period on all the jury trials over
which they presided. Each judge told us how the jury
decided the case and how he, the judge, would have
decided it, had he sat without a jury. The design thus
experiment.
for

time

a

made

of the fact that every
simultaneously: once before the
use

presiding judge, who, if there

One applies to the realism of simulation; the other,
degree of generalizing from experimental findings.
In this experiment there were two simulated elements:
the experimental stimulus was greatly reduced (a two-day
cance.

The

case

is tried

jury

and

were no

twice, albeit

once

jury

before the

in the case,

would have to render the judgment.
This research design is but a natural controlled

experi
special order. Experimental stimulus (the jury)
and control (the judge) are present in every case, but
unlike a planned experiment, there is, except for the
ment

of

a
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The

the

who may

preside over several trials, no replication.
jury changes from trial to trial; and most important,

judge

of course, is never the same. The statistical
of such an experiment is relatively low. But this

case, too,

precision
lack of precision is the price for an unusually broad focus:
the study surveys the whole spectrum of cases that come
before the American jury. In this sense, the research de
sign may fittingly be called a survey experiment.
From these data it was possible to determine how often
judge and jury agree or disagree; and when they disagree,
one could trace and count the reasons for their
disagree
ment since through some fifty-odd
questions most de
tailed information became available on every case.
The first part of this study on the role of the jury in
criminal trials has just been published.f Figure 4-1 re
produces one of its basic findings.

Jury
Acquits

Convicts

Acquits

Judge
Convicts

13

2

17

63

Hangs
1
4

100%
(3,576)

TOTAL
NUMBER OF TRIALS
=

Agreement

Figure

4-1.

Agreement and Disagreement between Jury
and

Judge

in Criminal Trials

and jury agree in (13 + 63 =) 76 per cent of all
and
of the 24 per cent disagreement' cases, the jury
cases;
is found on the defendant's side in (17 + 4 =) 21 per

Judge

cent

and

of these

the

on

prosecutor's

side in

(1

+2

=)

3 per

cent

Secondary Analysis
Two studies of contemporary legal
tinguished by their being primarily

hinges, of
disagreement with
the judge but on the reasons that produce these disagree
ments, and it is the presentation and analysis of these
reasons that form the main
body of the study. They range
course,

not

only

on

the

as an

extent

from different sentiments

institution

of its

the law which the

jury en
(in spite
judge may give them)
through sentiments concerning the particular defendant,
different views on the weight of the evidence, and occa
on

of what law the

tertains

imbalance between the performance of the
and
defense counsel in the trial; a few times
prosecutor
it will even happen that the disagreement arises from a

sionally

to an

discrepancy

between what jury and

judge know

about the

case.

These

the five somewhat abstract categories in
specific causes of the various individual dis
agreements were ultimately summarized.
At this early point it is not possible to assay the practical
consequences of that study. At a minimum, it will lend
focus and precision to an important debate in which both
sides so far have never been able to draw on more than
anecdotal support."
are

which the

dis
of data

are

collected in normal administrative routine: one con
alleged deterrent effect of capital punishment,
the other the problem of court congestion and delay.
In the debate over the merits of capital punishment, the
abolitionists had for a long time no good answer to the
claim that the death penalty helped to deter would-be
murderers. The change came after Thorsten Sellin inves
tigated the problem." He compared homicide rates be
fore and after abolition in some jurisdictions; before and
after reintroduction in others; and in jurisdictions that
have the death penalty with adjacent jurisdictions that
have abolished it. His data made one point clear: what
ever other merits the death
penalty may have, it has no
traceable deterrent effect.
Sellin's data have been quoted wherever the issue is
being argued. To what extent they have been an effective
cause of abolition is nevertheless difficult to
say. Probably
they have not been a major cause; gro�ing revulsion
from deliberate killing and the actual or near execution

innocently convicted man have nearly always pro
major impetus. But Sellin's data have helped to
if
not convince, a special
silence,
opposition.
The study of court congestion opened insights into a
problem that is less dramatic but in the long run perhaps
more
persistent. It is one of the puzzling aspects of our
of

an

vided the

system that the

judicial
of

most

our

Chicago,

adjudication of civil claims in
metropolitan courts is scandalously delayed.

for instance, it takes on the average five and
a claim is filed until it can be

half years from the date
tried before a jury.
a

The evaluation of the jury

problems
reanalyses

cerned the

In

cases.
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1957, the University of Chicago

In

lished

of this

study
methodological

this

a

dred pages of
most

entirely

course

Law School

pub
congestion problern'" which had

distinction: its more than three hun
and analysis were based al
data that had become available in the

measurement
on

of routine

housekeeping by

the

courts

in their

normal administrative business. From these data a num
ber of measurements and parameters were developed that
were

the

acquire

to

courts: a

some

currency in the administration of
measuring delay was devel

basic formula for

variety of remedies was evaluated, and, as the
may be, rejected, recommended, or suggested for
further investigation. Among the latter were the pretrial
and the split trial discussed above.
With the ever mounting costs of securing primary data,
this harvest from secondary analysis holds a promise for

oped,26

a

case

social research

generally.

Surveys
Although,

as we

have seen, the border line between exper
not a
sharp one, it is useful to dis-

iment and survey is

The

Vol. 15 No.2

University of Chicago

especially since, in contrast to the experi
primary function of the survey is to provide
description. Out of the rapidly growing number of sur
veys undertaken to give guidance to the lawmakers, only

tinguish

the two,

ment, the

two

will be mentioned here. Both deal with

legal problems;
legislation, the other
one

most acute

with the enforcement of
with the

costs

civil-rights

of automobile acci

dents.
In 1962 Blumrosen and Zeitz

began

investigate the

to

antidiscrimination laws and its

operation of

New

Civil

Commission. Blumrosen examined all

Right

Jersey's

cases

the fiscal years 19621963, and Zeitz made a survey among Negroes on their
attitudes toward enforcement of these laws." The main

filed with the commission

during

finding of their study was that "the laws of New Jersey
against discrimination were not meaningfully and effec
tively enforced," partly because the Negroes themselves
shied away from individual enforcement and partly be
in the commission itself. The

study
legislature substan
tially increased the commission's budget; the commission
itself sharpened some of its policies and much of its mode
of operations; and the state's attorney-general would
speak of his civil-rights division as having been "a shield"
cause" of

had

so

a

shortcomings

number of traceable effects: the

far but

now to

become "a sword."28

The survey on the costs of automobile accidents is the
latest on an issue of long-standing concern to the law and

has

distinguished
published
study
Columbia University
a

was

research

The first

history.

in 1932 under the

auspices

major
of the

Committee for Research in the So

cial Sciences." Like the latest, the Michigan study, it too
was a joint effort" of lawyers and social scientists. It sur

veyed broadly, if somewhat haphazardly,
problem caused by automobile accidents.

the

reparation

The evidence

variety of sources, but even where sur
and
vey data were used, no claim was made to precision
first
in
as
approaches,
many
completeness. Nevertheless,
was

drawn from

a

problem and the areas of research
emerged with great clarity and thus marked an important
the outlines of the

beginning.

The

next

step

came

in 1953 when Professor

Adams of the Business School at Temple University
studied the financial and legal history of a random sample
of one hundred automobile accidents in the City of Phila

delphia and thus established the pattern for later efforts."
The Philadelphia survey displayed all the glories and
some of the inadequacies of an inspired, pioneering shoe
string operation. The present study, undertaken jointly
by lawyers and social scientists at the University of Michi
gan, is the

It

covers

apex of this development."

injured in automobile
Michigan during
ingeniously combines two samples

all individuals killed

or

accidents that occurred in the State of

calendar year and
represent this universe:

one

to

police,

one

taken from the files of the

the other from the files of the

courts

where per-

27
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sonal

claims

injury

unfinished

are

litigated. The difficulty of the yet
elegantly solved by substituting
comparable group of earlier long

court case was

the results reached in

a

major research instrument was a mail
questionnaire to the parties concerned or to their heirs,
thoughtfully supplemented at critical points with per

delayed

The

cases.

sonal interviews,
in the cases.

We

now

have

especially

with the

plaintiffs' lawyers

reliable, precise, quantitative information

almost every aspect of the injury-reparation process
and hence a sound factual basis for the many debates
which are currently raging over that problem area.32 To

on

be sure, we have this knowledge only for one year and
only for the State of Michigan. But, the United States
being what it is, one should not be in danger if one
generalizes from these findings. If there are doubts, they
can be removed
by duplication of the study elsewhere.
The survey provides, as any good survey should, infor
mation on both details and broad outlines. Roughly one
of every hundred Michigan residents suffered some loss
in an automobile accident during a year. For over 60 per

of the persons involved in accidents, the loss was
$500; another 30 per cent suffered losses between
$500 and $3,000; and the remaining 2 or 3 per cent suf
fered losses beyond $70,000.
In terms of all victims or their heirs, 23 per cent re
cent

below

compensation from any source, 37 per cent
tort liability settlement, and about half of
the victims received some compensation from loss, colli

ceived

no

received

some

sion, medical
total dollar

care or

life insurance. But in

terms

of the

all victims, almost half of the
remained uncompensated. The sources of

amount

total

damages

total

compensation

paid

were

to

tort

liability,

55 per cent; loss

38 per cent; workmen's compensation and social
security, 7 per cent. The surprising finding was the great
role played by loss insurance and the increasing impact

liability,

of the

social-security

laws.

The Trend
The sharp increase in recent years in the number and
quality of social-science investigations of legal institu
tions was spawned by a number of convergent develop
ments. There was first a jurisprudential movement, the

Realists, who, beginning

in the

twenties, asked that the

explored in contrast to the law on the
books. Strangely enough, their aim remained for a long
time no more than a battle cry. Only now, a generation
law in action be

later, does

it

assume

substancc.i''' The second

source was

rapid development of research techniques and a con
comitant growth of sociological research in general."
It now appears that we are standing at the beginning of
the

an

era

in which the lawmakers will find

increasing

use

social-science research in the sound expecta
tion that it is bound to alleviate their difficult task: of

for

empirical

making good

law.
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In modern times, William Petty's survey of Ireland, made at
the time of the Cromwellian conquest, is perhaps one of the
first systematic surveys conducted for the lawmaker. British,
and to a much lesser extent also American, legislation has a

1964),

lative and administrative committees in the United States,
have made in their time major contributions to the law and
incidentally also the body of social science. See Marie

Jahoda, Paul

2.

F.

Lazarsfeld,

Hans

Zeisel, Marienthal:

in the celebrated decision of the United States

Board

v.

of Education, the

sor

School. On the latest

ed.

rarely

in the

Desegregation

of the
was

two experiments discussed so far,
experimental variable was not under the control
experimenter: in the bail-bond experiment, the final

up to the

or not to

release the defendant without bail

and the decision whether

judge;

or

not

a

pre

be held was, in fact, left to the litigants. Yet
because of the prior randomization of the experimental and
the control group, these decisions did not invalidate the con

trial

was

to

trolled character of the experiments. For general exposition
of this approach, see Irwin Towers, Leo Goodman, and Hans
Zeisel, "A Method of Measuring the Effects of Television
through Controlled Field Experiments," Studies in Commu
nication, IV (1962), 87.

Cases

Review, VI (1960), 69; A. J. Gregor, "The Law, Social Sci
and School Segregation: An Assessment," Western
Reserve Law Review, XIV (1963)" 621-636; Ovid C. Lewis,

15.

This suggestion

"Parry and Riposte

16.

op. cit., note 5, p. 99.
See Hans Zeisel and Thomas

Callahan, "Split Trial and
Time-Saving: A Statistical Analysis," Harvard Law Review,
LXXVI (1963), 1606-1625.

17.

One of these many court decisions had a direct reference to
the Zeisel-Callahan paper: Driver v. Phillips et al., U.S. Dis
trict Court E.D. Pa., December 14, 1964,36 FRD 261 (1964).

18.

See Rita James Simon, The American Jury-The Defense of
Insanity (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
There were also two minor variations built into the experi
ment pertaining to the quality of the psychiatric
expert testi
mony and to the informing of the jury as to the consequences
of a finding of insanity.
Simon, op. cit. Note 18, Chapter 4.
Symposium, "Insanity and the Criminal Law-A Critique of
Durham v. United States," University of Chicago Law
Review, XXII (1955), 31-7.
Harry Kalven, [r., and Hans Zeisel, T he American Jury
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
It is, however, possible to cite one early application of find
ings from the jury study, albeit to a proposed reform of the
English jury. The British government has proposed legisla

to Gregor's The Law, Social Scientist,
Segregation," ibid., 637.
3. See Hans Zeisel, "The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence,"
Cornell Law Quarterly, XLV, (1960),322.
4. By way of apology: it is impossible to list all such studies; any
offered selection is bound to remain arbitrary.
5. The argument that follows has been developed in more detail
in Hans Zeisel, "The New York Expert Testimony Project:
Some Reflections on Legal Experiments," Stanford Law
Review, VIII (1956), 730-749, and in Hans Zeisel, Harry
Kalven [r., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Bos
ton: Little, Brown,
1959), Chapter 21: The Case for the
Official Experiment.
6. California Board of Correction Monographs, Sacramento.
7. See Daniel Glaser, The EtJectiveness of a Prison and Parole
System (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. 34.
8. Cf. Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, op. cit., Note 5, p. 143 ff,
9. Maurice Rosenberg, The Pretrial Conference and EtJective
Justice (Columbia University Press, New York and London,
1964).
io. The control group was allowed to have optional pretrial,
because it was thought that to simply deprive these litigants
of their right to pretrial might engender constitutional diffi
.

culties.
One may ask

why

One

is that the

the

did not abolish pretrial altogether.
particular experiment answered the
issue conclusively only with respect to the option alternative.
Moreover, pretrial had deep roots in the state's tradition, and
the limited design of the experiment probably offered a
welcome pretext for a compromise.
The pioneering study was Arthur Beeley, The Bail System in
Chicago (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927). A sur
answer

vey of the literature

Patricia

Wald,

state

can

be found in Daniel Freed and

Bail in the United States

(Washington, D.C.,

too was

made in Zeisel, Kalven, and Buch

holz,

and School

12.

feasible. Even in the

decision whether

Villanova Law

ence,

11.

Rankin,

the ultimate-

150. There was even considerable debate about the evidential
value of that research. See Kenneth B. Clark, "The Desegre
gation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role," Vil
lanova Law Review, V (1960), 224, 236; Ernest van den

Professor Kenneth Clark,"

A.

of land. But in the realm of the law such direct control is

considerations; see, for instance, Edmond Cahn, Juris
prudence," New York University Law Review, XXX (1955),

to

Ares,

Court

14.

moral

Reply

C. E.

see also Caleb Foote, "The
Coming Constitutional
Crisis in Bail," University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
CXIII (1965), 959.
13. National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Interim

probably to a not very relevant piece of research.
It concerned an experiment designed to prove the evil of
segregation. The legal scholars seem to be agreed that it did
not influence the Court, which was clearly moved
by larger,

Haag, "Social Science Testimony

see

cation,

case, refers

-A

developments

and H. Sturz, "The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole," New York University
Law Review, XXXVIII (1963), 67. On the long-range impli

desegregation

Supreme

school

brought the reform move
fruition began with a distinguished study by Profes
Caleb Foote of the University of Pennsylvania Law

Report (Washington, D.C.: 1965), p. xxv.
Normally, it is considered essential that in a controlled exper
iment the experimenter be in direct control of the experi
mental variable: if two types of fertilizer are to be tested, he
must be able to control their assignment to the various plots

new

C Allensbach: Verlag fur Dernoskopie, 1960), Appendix, Zur
Geschichte der Soziographie.
Ironically, the most famous of these social-science footnotes,
in Brown

pp. 9-21. The attack that

ment to

tradition of

relying on systematically collected facts whenever
broad legislative issues are at debate. Royal Commissions,
Select Committees, and Ad Hoc Committees in the British
Empire and Commonwealth, Congressional and other legis
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19.

20.
21.

22.
23.

tion that would allow
in criminal

majority

and

verdicts of 10:2 and 11:1

votes

thereby the requirement of
unanimity. It was possible to provide the British Home Office
with a set of relevant predictions as to what to expect from
such a law, because one of the American states, Oregon,
allows the majority verdicts Great Britain plans to introduce.
The first prediction was that the number of hung juries
(juries in which a mistrial is declared because unanimity
cannot be reached) would decrease by about 40
per cent.
Since about 5 per cent of all trials end in hung juries, this
means a change for two out of every hundred trials. The
second piece of relevant information was that the presiding
judge is by no means always critical of these juries who
cases

remove

The

Vol. 15 No.2

University of Chicago

hung at a 10:2 or 11:1 vote; about one-third of these
are characterized as a result "which a judge too
juries
hung
might have come to." Thus, not all of these hung juries are
without merit. Thirdly, the Oregon experience suggested that
England must henceforth expect some dissent in about one
fourth of all jury verdicts, an experience that might well be
shocking in view of the serious sentence that usually follows
a
verdict of guilty. See H. Kalver Jr. & H. Zeisal, The
American Jury; Notes for an English Controversy, Round
Table, No. 226, April 1967.
24. Thorsten Sellin, in Royal Commission on Capital Punish
ment, Minutes of Evidence (London: H. M. Stat. Off. 1951),
p.647.
25. Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz, op. cit. Note 5.
26. Ibid., pp. 6 and 43. It has now been adopted as standard
measurement by the Administrative Office of the Illinois
remain

Courts.

27. A. B. Blumrosen, "Antidiscrimination Laws in Action in

Jersey; A Law-Sociology Study," with a supplement:
Zeitz, "Survey of Negro Attitudes toward Law," Rutgers
Law Review, XIX (1965), 189, 288.

New
L.

28.
29.

30.

32.

33.

a

Attorney-General

contracts"-which became

law of

(1955).

al., Automobile Accident Costs and
Payments: Studies in the Economics of Injury Reparation
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1964).
Compare Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven Jr. Public Law
Prospectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto Compensation
Plans. Little, Brown & Co., 1965.
The two most distinguished names in that group were Karl
N. Llewellyn, until his recent death professor at the Univer
sity of Chicago Law School, and Jerome Frank, judge and
Alfred F. Conard

et

Zeisel, "Social Research on the Law: The Ideal and
Practical," in William M. Evan, ed., Law and Sociology
(Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1962), p. 124.

See Hans
the

only

area

use

stricted

the

of law which

sense.'

term

It

has,

to

date,

"commercial law" in

be

might

gone

through

thought

a

curiously

re

that the sale and

financing of Blackacre and the multi-million dollar office
building which has been, or is to be, built on Blackacre
is

quite

as

automobile

"commercial"
or

a

as

piece of

of

an

equipment. But,

in

the sale and

industrial

financing

the vocabulary of any lawyer, as in the curriculum of any
law school, "commercial law" stops well this side of
Blackacre. This usage seems to have established itself
more than a hundred years ago. It came in at the time of

the first great debate

on

codification, which occupied the

in this country from the 1820's until
after the Civil War. The proponents of codification, who

legal profession
were

both

numerous

designate the
goods and, some

art to

twins.

were

codification, even in their
an odd
pair of siamese
together
like

linked

Both, indeed,

direct

were

legacies

from the

and

influential, regularly argued

eigh

teenth century Industrial Revolution and the banking
system which it called into being. The manufacture and

distribution of

goods

became almost

central

overnight

to

the proper functioning of the most dynamic and unstable
society of which we have record. Almost overnight the

relevant, supporting bodies of law

were

improvised,

in

an

judicial energy. It is fair to
extraordinary outpouring
that
there
was no commercial law-that is, no body
say
of

of law which the

legal

mind felt

to

be somehow distinct

and separate and identifiable-much before 1800. Yet,
less than half a century later, Justice Story, surely a quali
fied observer, could say that the rules of law relating to
"commercial contracts"
"have attained

scientific

a

clearness, which give them
treated

as a

fixed system of

precision, and accuracy, and
an
indisputable title to be
national jurisprudence."!

suggested a codification-what he
once called
legislative authority"--of this
"digest
national
"fixed system of
jurisprudence" as a solution
which
were
to two problems
already bothersome and
of
shortly becoming intolerable.' One
gave every sign
was the
problem
increasing flood of case reports which,
in a society become lawless from a surfeit of law, would
soon make it impossible for any judge to declare the
law or for any lawyer to advise his clients as to what the
law was. The other problem was the progressive tend
ency toward local fragmentation of the substantive law
and others

Story

under

a

a

federal system in which there was, it
declared

on

high authority,

no

was

common

Court

was

to

exercise

no

control

over

the

occasion

law of the

United States and in which the United States

successive rounds of codification.

We

negotiable

origins,

ally
(Continued from page 1, Col. 1)

the

of

instruments, sales of

Thus commercial law and

in

as

term

a

later, personal property security transactions.

what

Consequences
J. Adams,
Injuries Sustained in 1953 Philadelphia Automobile Acci
dents," Temple University Economics and Business Bulletin,

author.
34.

that the greatest benefits from a codification of the sub
stantive law would be found in the area of "commercial

of Personal

"Economic Financial

VII

31.

the Office of the

press release

by
(May 12, 1965).
Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents,
Report (New York: Columbia University Committee for
Research in the Social Sciences, 1932).
From
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Supreme

state

courts

in their determination of what the local version of the
common

law

was

to

be.

problems and real evils which required
remedy. The conscious thought of the period
saw codification as the only way out of the impasse.
We might indeed have had a general codification by
1850-in which case we would have inherited a quite
different complex of legal traditions from those we have.
The law, however, mysteriously provides its own solu
tions, although it may take us fifty or a hundred years
to see that they were solutions. I suggest that three devel
opments combined to make the abrupt remedy of a
general codification unnecessary and to make a relatively
pure common law system viable for fifty years after it
might well have collapsed of its own weight.
These

were

solution and

real
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There was, in the first place, the rapid
provision of a
specifically American legal literature, which supplied an

orderly

of rule and

in a form accessi
There was, secondly, the
establishment of the handful of so-called national law
schools which, both in their faculties and in their student

ble

statement

the

to

principle

practicing lawyer."

bodies, represented a truly extraordinary concentration
of talent. In their teaching, these schools seem, almost
from the beginning, to have indoctrinated or brain
washed their students in the idea that there was such a
thing as the true rule of law-a universal and unchanging
absolute, always and everywhere the same. As a matter
of jurisprudence, the proposition was
untenable.

clearly

As

description

of what

actually

going on in the
United States, with its continental
range and its melting
pot population, it was grotesque to the point of absurdity.
As a device for promoting national
uniformity in the law,
a

it could

was

have been better

designed. Thirdly, and
important, was the announcement in 1843 by a
unanimous Supreme Court, in Swift v. Tyson,4 of the
doctrine of the general federal commercial law. The obvi
ous solution to the
problem of local diversity has always
not

most

been federalization of the substantive law. We have never
forthrightly adopted the federal solution; on the other
hand, we have never been able to do quite without it and
the federal principle has a way of rising
stronger than
ever from its own ashes each time it is
ceremonially con
signed to the funeral pyre. At all events the point about

Swift
no

v.

Tyson

is

not

interest and could

the

itself, which

was

have been left

to

case

easily

of almost

wither

on

the vine. The point is that the doctrine of the
federal commercial law was
gratefully

general
accepted in all

lovingly tended and persuaded to flourish like
the green bay tree. The Supreme Court of the United
States became, and for fifty years remained, the
country's
quarters,

leading commercial court-a surprising discovery for any
lawyer who knows the court only in its current guise.
These devices
law for
tion

fifty

vintage

postponed

the codification of commercial
in the event,

that,
years,
1900 instead of
so

one

vintage

we

got

a

codifica

1850. That made

good deal of difference-although the difference was
essentially one of form, not substance. That, to any law
yer, should be enough. The life of the law, as Justice
Holmes might well have told us, has not been substance;
it is, always has been and always will be, form.
a

An 1850

codification, we might think, would have been
disaster because in fact few of the propositions which
had seemed true in 1850 as rules of sales law or of
nego
tiable instruments law or of security law had survived
until 1900 in anything like a recognizable form. Many of

a

the

rules, indeed, including the

effect been

most

basic ones, had in

replaced by their opposites. These reversals
had been worked out by the courts with the aid of inher
ently flexible and increasingly refined case-law techniques.
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How could the

been hobbled

job have been done
by statutory fetters?

at

all if the

courts

had

An 1850 codification would, I am sure, have had no
effect whatever in preventing the necessary evolution and
transformation of rules and principles. We know now
that the 1900 codification had no such effect. Weare
already far enough into our experience with the 1950

codification-the Uniform Commercial Code-to be
that it will have
in

stabilizing

no more success

this

remarkably

than did its

unstable

body

sure

predecessors
of law.

Businessmen and their lawyers have always had an
almost obsessive desire for certainty, and the
predictabil
ity which results from certainty, in the law which regu
lates commercial transactions. Why this is so is easy to

understand: there is

great deal of money at uncertain
helpful to know what will happen if
such and such a transaction is carried out in such and
such a form. On the other hand, after a hundred and
fifty years of experience, we can say with confidence that

risk;

it would be

there

are

few, if

a

of the law in which

certainty
always have been, at such a
premium and in which, the opinions of counsel to the
contrary notwithstanding, sailing blind over uncharted
seas is, and
always has been, so recurrently the order of
the day. Why this is so is also easy to understand. In the
extraordinary dynamism, which has been the glory or
despair of our industrialized society, the patterns and
practices, the methods and techniques of "doing business"
have, from the clearest of necessities, been in the highest
degree unstable. Generation by generation, almost decade
by decade, radically new problems have demanded radi
cally new solutions. The law, a faithful reflector of what
ever is, has
simply mirrored the chronic instability of
business practice.
The desire for certainty and predictability no doubt
played a considerable role in gaining acceptance for the
idea of a commercial codification in the first
place and
in actually bringing it about, not once but twice.
Oppo
nents of codification have
always argued that a Code,
specific enough to be meaningful, would have the unde
sirable effect of freezing the law as of the date of the
Code's enactment. I have suggested that the
problem is
not a real one-that the
freezing effect does not take
place. The mirror image of that suggestion is that the
and

any,

predictability

areas

are,

and

fancied benefit which will result from the Code-the an
ticipated gain in certainty and predictability-is not real
either. Both the gains we had hoped for and the losses
we

had feared

turn out to

be

largely illusory.

The codification of commercial law which we got after
1900 was at a far remove from the 19th century
European
Codes. The differences

attributable

timing and
be
differences
chronology
they
tween the American
mind
and
the
legal
European or
between a common law and a civil law system. An
much

more

are

than

are

to

to

The
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might well have been
model:
comprehensive and de
quite
European
from
the
date
of
to
enactment, the exclusive
be,
signed
source of law. At least that hypothesis is plausible in the
light of the Field Codes, drafted during the 1850's for

American codification in 1850

like the

in New

enactment

York, which

were

very much in the

civil law tradition." I have

European
the fifty-year delay
or

suggested

that

in
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swallow. But

single

a

we

broke with the older tradi

significantly by making it expressly clear
codifying statutes were not designed to be, and

tion

even more

that

our

be taken as, exclusive statements of all the
law, past, present and future. From the N.LL. on, each
of the Uniform Acts contained a section captioned "Cases
not to

were

Provided For

not

This Act"

by

some

or

the codification made
carrying
all
a
deal
difference
in
of
the
important matter of
great
form: this is one of the points at which the delay seems

N.LL. formula

have been decisive.
Instead of a comprehensive Code of Commercial Law,
we
got a series of separate statutes, each purporting to

In the Sales Act the formula had become

in

out

to

deal with

of them

a

bit

or a

piece

purporting

fragment

or a

of the

field,

the whole law of the

to state

none

matter

with respect to its own bit or piece or fragment.
These statutes were drafted under the sponsorship of the
even

National
State

Conference of Commissioners

Laws, which

was

set

up

as

a sort

of

on

Uniform

subsidiary

to

the American Bar Association

during the 1890's. Within
ten or fifteen years the Conference promulgated uniform
acts on negotiable instruments, sales, bills of lading, ware

house receipts and stock transfers. All these acts were, in
remarkably short order, widely enacted-some in all
states, others in all but a handful of states. On the other

hand, subsequent attempts by
the law of

the Conference

to

codify

transactions

personal

met
property security
with relative failure." It may be that the steam had gone
out of the movement or that the material of security law,
then in a state of violent and rapid flux, was intractable.
events that part of the commercial complex was
another
generation of non-uniform and largely
given
case-law growth before being brought under the statutory

At all

yoke.
of the country by 1920, and in many states
as
early as the 1900's, we had a codified law of sales,
negotiable instruments, documents of title and security
Thus in

most

transfer. The several statutes, thanks no doubt to their
common sponsorship, were loosely related even if they
were

in

even

if

These
we

they

did

statutes

had

integrated. They were on speaking terms
not always speak the same language.
were, truly, codifying statutes of a type

no sense

not

theretofore known. Between 1850 and 1900
a great deal of legislative activity in the

there had been

commercial law

area.

The law of sales and

instruments had been moved

a

negotiable

considerable distance from

pure common law base. But the earlier statutes had
been narrow, specific and precise. For the first time, with

a

get statutes which, for
broad sweep; which do
not deal merely with details of custom and practice;
which provide a general framework for the whole of the
the N.LL. and the Sales Act,
incompleteness, take

all their

we

a

relevant area of law.
We broke then with the European tradition by codify
ing bit by bit and piece by piece instead of all at once

variant. The

was:

"In any case not provided for in this act the rules of law
and equity including the law merchant shall govern."?

elaborate:

more

"In any case not provided for in this act, the rules of law
and equity, including the law merchant, and in particular

relating to the law of principal and agent and to
fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy and other invalidating cause, shall
continue to apply to contracts to sell and to sales of
the rules

the effect of

goods."8
Thus the

codifying

swallow up the
broad range, in the

statutes were not to

pre-statutory law which was, over a
Sales Act formulation, to "continue

to

apply."

The

stat

engrafted on the parent stock of
the common law in the hope that graft and stock would
continue, both vital, to grow together.
The general understanding of the profession seems to
have been that the codifying statutes were merely declara
be,

utes were to

tory of the

so to

say,

law-like the Restatements of the

common

Since

following generation.
law was, there
attention
much
pay

was no

mon

statute

seriously

to

lawyers knew what the com
particular reason for them to

the statutory text or to take the
take it as a statute. In the case

or even to

of the Sales Act, this tendency
that the draftsman, Professor

duced

magisterial

a

treatise

statute." In the Sales Act
Williston
to

ence

by

the fact

sales

to

to and quotations
copious
Sales; nothing is rarer than a direct
Sales Act itself; judicial analysis of the

on

the

pro

accompany the
law nothing is more com

on

case

reinforced

Williston, promptly

allusions

than

mon

was

from
refer
statu

almost nonexistant. It is true that in this
tory
N.LL.
suffered a somewhat different fate from
the
respect
the Sales Act-perhaps because no treatise of the stature
text was

of Williston

gloss

on

the

Sales

on

statute.

sections of the N.LL.
even

and

the

provided

to

serve

as

a

few-not very many
be treated as holy writ,

events a

came

of the

though
largely disregarded.
rest

ever

was

At all

to

statute

could be taken

lightly

loosely drafted statutes, which
expressly kept open the possibility of further case law
development and which were generally regarded as not
much more than Restatements. The problem of living
We had then

a

with such

statutes

conclude,

not an

difficult

ing

as

the

series of

under such circumstances was, we may
intolerably difficult one-surely not as

problem which the courts will face in liv
during the second half of the century.

with the Code

But there is

one

more

point about living

with statutes,
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which is

presumably

true now or next

as

century

as

it

in 1900.

was

to

unhappy fact of life that, while we can know
the past only imperfectly, we know the future not at all.
Our best informed guesses about what is going to happen
It is

an

have

uncomfortable habit of missing the mark
These truisms may seem to make the lot of
the statutory draftsman a particularly unhappy one. On

next

an

completely.

another level of

analysis, they

tion and salvation-at least

to

may represent his justifica
the extent of guaranteeing

that his statute will do no particular harm since it will
in all probability have nothing, or almost nothing, to say
about the issues which become the focus of litigation dur
ing its life. From our vantage point in time we can see a
few examples of how this process worked out in the case
of the turn of the century statutes.
The N.LL. is the classical

almost

entirely

which,

even

any

at

significant

current

to

example

the resolution of

the time the

statistical

statute

was

a statute

devoted

important issues
drafted, had, in

lost all relevance for the
the central proposition of

sense,

Undoubtedly
century negotiable

scene.

nineteenth

of

once

instruments law-which

naturally became the heart of the
that the holder in due course of

codifying
an

statute-was

instrument held it

free of equities of ownership and of defenses. Now it is
clear enough that due course holding or good faith pur
chase becomes a matter of importance, with respect to
any type of property, only when that property is regu
and sold in a market and may be expected
from
hand
to hand in a series of transfers."? From
pass
sometime in the eighteenth century+' and for a hundred

larly bought
to

so

thereafter mercantile bills of

years

or

notes

had in fact circulated in such

development

of

a

exchange

and

before the

market;
modern system of bank credit, such
a

indispensable supplement to a chronically
inadequate supply of currency. The theory of due course
holding was an obvious legal response to an obvious
paper

was

an

commercial need. For a hundred years this theory had in
fact been the heart and center of negotiable instruments
law. At the time the N.LL. was drafted it had already
ceased to be so-for the reason that bills and notes had,
in

statistically significant volume,

ceased

to

circulate;

bank checks, the most recent addition to the family of
short-term money instruments, of course never had cir
culated. We need not insist, for the sake of paradox, that
commercial paper had quite ceased to circulate in 1900.12
the

point

is that

holding-had
in

most

It is

institutional

an

the

negotiability-in

become

a

matter

lending

occupational

of

sense

of due

course

peripheral importance

transactions.

hazard of

a

draftsman,

as

he lov

instructive

example.

on
an

We may say that the law of negotiable instruments has
do with the rules of law which regulate instruments

which evidence either payment of debt or extension of
credit. By 1900 the typical payment instrument had be
the check and the check

come

of

necessarily

with banks

relationship
people
ships of banks among

as

well

as

involves the
the relation

themselves. To the extent that
and acceptances continued in use, it had become
customary in this country to domicile them by making
them "payable at" the maker's or acceptor's bank of
notes

deposit. It is hard to imagine any sort of instrument
within the coverage of the N.LL. which would not in
volve, at some point in its life history, the use of the
system for collection, or the
bank and its customer, or both.

banking
a

relationship

between

Bank collections and the bank-depositor relationship
would have been, the intelligent analyst will assume,
among the central preoccupations of the draftsman. The
moral of the story is that the N.LL. contains nothing
whatever which is relevant either
collections

to

the law of bank

the

bank-depositor relationship or which
even
thought about either
of
the
most
N.LL. provisions on
problem. Furthermore,
indorsement, transfer, presentment and payment (or
dishonor), which made perfect sense with respect to the
transactions the rules were designed to deal with, made
or

to

suggests that the draftsman

little

sense or nonsense or even a

respect

banks

sort

of anti-sense with

holders, agents for collection and
All these matters became the focus of a great

to

as

payors.l"
deal of litigation during the N.LL. period. Since the codi
fying statute was unhelpful and, indeed, in many respects
positively harmful, there was need, as we endured the
boom of the twenties and the gloom of the thirties, for a
great deal of legislation, non-uniform and much of it
hastily contrived, to remedy these glaring deliciencies.l"
to

You may feel that the inadequacies of the N.LL. are
be attributed to an unimaginative and incompetent

draftsman-and indeed, so far as we know anything
about the draftsman, there is good reason to believe that
he

was

both

unimaginative and incompetent. Weare
having the Sales Act as a com

therefore fortunate in

panion piece, since its draftsman, Professor Williston,
had, in the highest degree, all the qualities which, for
the sake of argument, we may assume the N.LL. drafts
man to have lacked. Nevertheless, it is
quite as true of
the Sales Act

as it is of the N.LL. that the statute
proved
be largely irrelevant to the issues which in fact pro
vided the focus of litigation during the Sales Act period.

to

It may be added that

be

embalms the past, to fail to see what is going
before his eyes. In this respect too the N.LL. offers us

ingly
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as

harmful

as

in the Sales Act proved to
of the N.LL. provisions-which

nothing

some

may be a measure of the draftsman's genius.
It has become a truism to say that the volume of sales

litigation dropped sharply after 1900 or thereabouts. One
explanation for the decline, which found favor among

The

Vol. 15 No.2

University of Chicago

the proponents of a recodification, was that the law as
codified in the Sales Act was so out of tune with the
needs of this century, so anti-commercial, that the mer
community fled the courts in favor of an extra

cantile

resolution of their

judicial

disputes by

Accepting the proposition that
out-of-date, I suggest that the decline
trators.

sales

just

litigation
as

and there

the Sales Act

was

in the volume of

apparent than real. There was
litigation as there ever had been. To

was more

much sales

much of the

commercial arbi

litigation

was

no

the Sales Act contributed

need

to

nothing

cite it. Meanwhile the West

Publishing Company, imprisoned in its own categories,
digested the cases under Contracts, Agency and God only
knows what other headings.
There was, for example, a great deal of litigation after
1900 about various types of long-term contractual ar
rangements: output contracts, requirements contracts,
contracts with open or flexible pricing arrangements. In
the state of law which the Sales Act reflected, the typical
transaction was conceived to be a one-shot single delivery
deal. The Act contained almost nothing relevant to the
problems presented by long-term arrangements or for
of sale.l" These

ward

contracts

were,

clearly enough,

contracts

new
types of
for the sale of

contracts

goods.

It

might therefore be assumed that decisions concerning
their validity and proper construction would be thought
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law but

as contract

law.

argue the point that sales law is con
cerned with the distribution of goods as they move from

We need

not

manufacturer or producer to the ultimate consumer. At
different periods in our history different methods of dis
tribution have been in use. During the first half of the
nineteenth century the factor, or agent for sale, was an
important figure in the distribution chain. Consequently
there developed an enormous amount of learning about
the law of factors and the relationship of the factor, his
principal and the people who either bought from the
factor goods consigned to him for sale or made loans to
him on the security of the goods.l" A Sales Act drafted in
1850 would have told us, in great detail, all about the
factoring. During the second half of the

institution of

century the factor gradually lost his 'importance as a dis
tribution agent and was replaced by a series of independ
ent

middlemen:

ers

through

goods

now

moved from the manufactur

various levels of wholesale distributors

to a

Naturally sales law of
the second half of the century tells us a good deal about
these independent middlemen. Most of this learning
passed into the Sales Act, which is quite as good on
middlemen as our hypothetical 1850 Act would have
retail outlet in

been

on

a

series of sales.

factors.

Oddly, however,
belonging
lowing the lead of the West Publishing Company, every
one agreed that these developments had nothing to do
with sales law but were properly part of the undifferenti
ated law of general contracts.
The fact that the Sales Act largely ignored long-term

independent middleman, like the fac
began to disappear from the commercial
scene.
Increasingly manufacturers began to control their
own retail outlets-either
directly or through franchise
arrangements with dealers. The complicated relationship
between manufacturer and dealer provoked a great deal
of litigation. Except for the accident of codification, it is

contractual arrangements also led to curious results with
respect to the calculation of damages for breach. The

nineteenth century

of

to

as

Sales Act

of breach

for such

damage
at

rules

were

quite clearly geared

to cases

perforrnance!" and,
In a long-term
perfect
breach
will
however,
typically. come at a

the time scheduled for

cases,

the rules made

arrangement,
time when the
contract, for

fol

the law of sales.

contract

is,

sense.

least in part, executory: the
run for five years and either

at

example, is to
seller or buyer repudiates after the first year. Application
of the Sales Act damage rules to that situation would
have produced legal chaos and economic nonsense. The
courts, responding sensibly to a difficult situation, con
structed a new set of damage rules without benefit of the
Sales Act.17 Indeed, by 1930 or so, the original Sales Act
rules had been in many states lost, mislaid or forgotten
so that, in the sales litigation spawned by the Great
Depression, it is common to find the new set of judicially
improvised damage rules applied not only to the case of
advance repudiation of executory contracts but also to
the case of present breach. As with the requirements con
tracts and open price arrangements, the law relating to
so-called anticipatory breach was thought of, not as sales

After 1900 the
before him,

tor

reasonable

to assume

significant figure

would have become

in sales law.

However, sales law

century has been whatever happened
Sales Act. Thus, while factors and
extent

they survive,

chised dealer is

Examples
only for the

dealer, like his

that the franchised

predecessors,

figures

are

in

to

a

in this

be covered in the

middleman, to the
sales law, the fran

not.

of this

sort

could

be

easily

multiplied-not

Sales Act and the N.LL. and their compan
ions but for any codifying statute, whatever the time
and

place

of its

drafting

and whatever the

coverage. Indeed I am sure that the
could be made quite as easily in the

same

area

of its

demonstration

area we

think of

as

legislation of the
1930's-as in the area of private law which occupies us
today. The truth of the matter is that we are always
outwitted and surprised by what actually happens
which is on the whole an excellent thing.
Thus, we shall no doubt be surprised by what happens

public law-say,

to

for the New Deal

the Uniform Commercial Code between

year 2000. We need not,
merely because the choice

now

and the

however, forego speculation
seems

to

lie between

being
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wrong for the

right

reasons

and

right

for the wrong

In what has

now

become the American tradition of

codification, the Code incorporates the

same form of
common-law saving clause which was included in the
earlier statutes.l'' Even without the saving clause we may
assume that the tradition would have
imposed itself: the

idea that

a

common

law but

codifying
to

statute comes not to

supersede

coexist with it has become

the

a

part
of our heritage, not to be gainsaid. If the Code had de
scribed itself as the exclusive source of law, we may doubt
that the description would have been taken seriously,
for

literary

purposes. But it does

The Code purports to be an integrated and unified
of commercial law-which the earlier statutes
neither purported to be nor were. No doubt some progress
made in this respect. It should be kept in mind,
was the better
part of twenty
years in the drafting and that the world of the 1950's,
was

however, that the Code

when the

project

was

finished,

was, in

some

respects,

a

different world from the world of the 1930's, when it was
begun. There are a good many discrepancies-internal

self-contradictions-within the Code. Some of these could
a more
thoughtful and careful job
of coordination had been done at the end. Others were
inherent in the structure: even if the statute had been
drafted by one hand, conceived and developed within a
single brain, the solitary draftsman's responses in the
1950's would not at all points have squared with his re
have been avoided if

sponses in the 1930's. Consistency is not, to that extent,
the hobgoblin of anyone's little mind. Thus the courts

will still have work

to do in
reconciling the irreconcilable,
harmonizing the disharmonies and so on. In this there is
nothing surprising: it is what judges are paid to do.
Stylistically, the Code is at a far remove from the
earlier statutes. It is tight where they were loose;
precise
where they were ambiguous; detailed and specific where
they were vague and general. I am sure that codifying
statutes which are loose,
ambiguous, vague and general
are to be
preferred to codifying statutes which are tight,
precise, detailed and specific. Here is a retrogression-no
doubt an inevitable retrogression. This is the way a gen

eration, weaned
There

to

on

be. The

the Internal Revenue Code, wants its
courts will
just have to try harder.

however, notable differences

style be
tween the Articles of the Code which were first drafted
such as Article 2 on Sales-and the later Articles-in
par
ticular, Article 9 on Secured Transactions. In style the
Sales Article can, without much exaggeration, be said to
be closer to its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act, than it
is to the Code Article on Secured Transactions. For this
difference there is an explanation in the Code's
drafting
are,

history. During

the

or

no

in

early years of drafting, practical men,
problems of the real world, paid
attention to the project: it was, like the

involved in the real

little

to

professors. By preference, perhaps for jurispru
dential reasons, law professors, whether they are
working
on Restatement or
Code, draft in a style of loose and
vague generality; they are not much concerned with pro
viding specific answers to specific questions; they are
concerned with the erection of a conceptual framework
which will at most, when a
is
specific

question

posed,

the range of possible answers. Prac
tical men seem to have become aware of the Code and
to have decided that
they should do something about it

guide

serve as a

only toward

to

the end of the 1940's. A

practitioner's in
at the opposite
preference,
drafting style,
from
the
I
have
attributed
to my own
pole
preference
breed. He quite naturally wants the statute to answer,
clearly and unequivocally, the questions which he wants
to put. So far as the Code was
concerned, the practition
stinctive

not.

treatment

statutes

Restatements, something which could safely be left
the law

reasons.

even
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ers

in

late

too

came

to

is

have much effect

on

those parts

which, like the Sales Article, had been finished and,
say, put on the shelf. The Code sponsors resisted
idea
of a general re-examination of the work
any
already
accomplished; except in detail the Sales Article, as well
as Article 3 on Commercial
Paper, retained their original
so

to

form and

style. They will, therefore,

live with. The

be

relatively

easy

did have the

practitioners
opportunity
to influence the
drafting of the later Articles. In many
respects, their participation was most helpful and the
product was greatly improved by being subjected to inten
sive professional scrutiny and analysis. A less fortunate
result was that the drafting style of the later Articles
was
greatly tightened up: the i's were dotted, the t's were
crossed, the questions were answered. Nowhere was this
to

process carried further than in the Article on Secured
Transactions, which is already beginning to creak ar

thritically in more than one of its joints.
Substantively, the Code, as all statutes must, devotes
most of its
wordage to a recreation of the past. Indeed,
in this respect, the Code outdoes its
predecessors since,
as a
general drafting principle, everything that was in
any of the earlier uniform commercial

acts

was

carried

into the Code.

Thus, all the 19th century rules,
which were obsolete or obsolescent even in 1900, are lov
ingly preserved. There is nothing objectionable in this.
over

It is what

call the museum aspect of codifica
without charm. It is unlikely that there
will ever again be a case involving the seller's right to
stop goods in transit on discovery of the buyer's in
solvency; it is pleasant, nevertheless, to have a section on
Stoppage in Transit which runs on for a full page of
smooth, well-varnished prose, transporting us nostalgi
cally back to the great days of railroading.i" Naturally,
the Code also reproduces the events of the
period between
we

tion and is

might

not

1900 and 1950. Thus the

requirements

contracts

and open

price arrangements which were missing from the Sales
Act make their appearance in the Code," along with a
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good

The

deal of material

contract

formation and modification of

on

which the earlier

statute

law.22 Bank collections and the

had left

to

the

bank-depositor

general
relation

ship, so strangely missing from the N.I.L., received de
tailed-perhaps overly detailed-treatment in Article 4 of
the Code. We may confidently expect that these Code
innovations will, like their Victorian predecessors, lose
interest as new and unexpected issues become the focus
of future litigation.
The Code broke new ground in Article 9 on Secured
Transactions. The earlier attempt to codify security law
had met with an almost flat failure.23 Most people who
were involved with Article 9 in the drafting stage ex
pected that the Article would arouse so much opposition
and would occasion

much controversy that its presence
enactment of the entire Code." In fact

might jeopardize

so

there was almost no opposition, the Article received gen
eral acclaim and its presence was undoubtedly the princi
pal reason why the Code was, within ten years, enacted

throughout the country. The Article 9 story
think, something about the real benefits of a

tells us, I
successful

a

can

be

when the time is

done,

ripe,

is

achieve

to

simplification of apparent complexity. Personal

security law had

in the 1940's reached

property
intolerable

an

there seemed to be no end to the proliferation of
security devices and with each new growth the
matted jungle of security law became more nearly im
passable. Beneath the surface, however, a process of uni
fication had been obscurely working itself OUt.25 The sep
state:
new

arate

trust

security
receipt,

devices-conditional
factor's lien and

so

sale, chattel mortgage,
on-tended

through

lose their separate identities and to fuse or merge
into each other. When the process had gone far enough,
time

to

it was no great trick to cut away the tangle of under
brush and reveal the unified structure of security law

already grown up. We should not forget the
fate of the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act of the 1920's,
which proposed essentially the same sort of simplification
that had

and
in

a

too

was never

enacted

anywhere. Retrospectively,

we are

position
say that the Chattel Mortgage Act came
soon: the underground process of unification had not
to

gone far

enough;

could

tangle
right time

not

the

-yet

diversity

be

and has had

cut
a

still had

deep

away. Article 9
success

as

roots; the

came

spectacular

at

the

as

the

earlier Act's failure.

living with the Code will, as in the
past,
degree solve themselves as new
issues appear with respect to which the Code's positive
provisions will, increasingly, have little relevance. The
overspecificity of some of the Code Articles and its occa
sional rigidity of detail will no doubt prove bothersome.
To the extent that it is true that the judges of our gen
eration are more timid, less willing to innovate, more
deferential to the legislative command than were the
The

problems

to

a

judges

of half

statute

through

a

century ago, the process of rewriting the
judicial decisions will become more diffi

cult. I was, I must say, gloomier about this aspect of
the problem ten years ago than I am today.i" Since then

developments

two

considerably cheered me up.
spectacular rebirth of judicial crea
Judicial activism on the public law

have

One has been the

tivity and energy.
side has, within a generation,
chunks of

mitted,

to

our

constitutional

universal acclaim. On the

same

seem

pressures
in the elaboration of

facturer's

liability

What had seemed
1930

was

judges,
ever

and rewritten great
law-not, it must be ad
recast

have been

private

at

law side the

work-for

example,

theories of a manu
users of his defective
products."
be a failure of judicial nerve after

radically

to
to

evidently

it appears,

to

a

are

new

merely
quite

phenomenon:
judge as they

temporary

willing

as

to

were.

The other has been the reappearance, after a short-lived
eclipse, of the general federal commercial law: the an
nouncement

exaggerated.

of its death in 1939 had
The federalization

can

be

evidently

been

in two

some

seen

developments. The federal bankruptcy
principal forum for the resolution
of novel issues of commercial law. The Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 seems to have contemplated, when it was first
enacted, a federal procedural framework for the liquida
tion (and later the reorganization) of insolvent estates,
to be carried out according to state law rules of property
and other rights. A notable feature of the history of
bankruptcy law, particularly during the past twenty years,
has been the gradual weakening of the state law compo
nent, the progressive strengthening of the federal law
componenr." The bankruptcy court has now a consider
able degree of freedom in deciding what the law ought to
what different

codification.
What
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of

considerable

courts

be;

it will in the future have

other
law

have become the

even

more

is the doctrine that

development
applies to any

transaction

to

freedom. The

federal,

not

state,

which the United

States, in any of its manifold capacities, is

a

party."

That

considerable number of transactions. Needless
to say, I do not expect to see the federal courts run
roughshod over state law as represented by the Code. On
the contrary, I would expect the federal courts to deal
includes

a

thoughtfully, intelligently and sympatheti
cally.
hope that, to avoid stumbling
blocks, the federal courts will on occasion take advantage
of their independence; if the results are sound, the state
courts can be expected to follow.
It is unlikely that the Code will be left to the courts
to
anything like the extent that its predecessors were.
Except for the N.I.L., the early uniform acts completed
their fifty-year run in much the shape, or in any case
form, they had been in to start with. The Code in all
probability will be the subject of a continual process of
legislative tinkering-partly because the spirit of the
times looks instinctively to a legislative solution, partly
with the Code

But I would also
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legislative tinkering-partly because the spint of the
times looks instinctively to a legislative solution, partly
because the overspecificity of some Articles of the Code
will make such a solution necessary.
Codification, we may conclude, is much more success
ful in abolishing the past than in controlling the future.
The future will, by and large, take care of itself-if the

won't, the legislatures will do whatever

courts

necessary. The true function of
reduce the past to order and

abolish it.30 A

evolving through

a

many cases, each

tied

and

Assembling

codifying statute is
certainty-and, thus,
a

of law

state

period
to

studying

time and energy. There is

may be

let

to
to

has,
assume, been
of time. There are a great

its

own

the

cases

room

for

us

peculiar
take

a

set

of facts.

great deal of

disagreement

on

just

how far the evolution has gone. A well-drafted codifying
statute can greatly simplify this
process. If the codifiers

unifying principle
diversity-as may have been

perceive

can

face

a

which underlies
the

case

sur

a

with Article 9

of the Commercial Code-the
will be dramatic. The

point from

which further

The law will continue
pear in
an

litigation;

the

accumulation of

resulting simplification
provides a new starting
exploration can be undertaken.

statute

to

new issues will
ap
will in time be buried under

evolve; the

statute

flood of

cases; the

cases

will

once

again threaten to overwhelm us. The time will have
come for another round of codification, in the course of
which the recodifiers will point out that the old statutes
obsolete, when they were drafted.
they
they had not been, they would
have done a considerable amount of harm instead of, by
were

obsolescent,

As indeed

it

not

were.

If

way of

simplification, a modest amount of good. If we
firm
keep
grasp on the basic principle of statutory ob
solescence, we should have no more trouble in living
with the Uniform Commercial Code than our predeces
a

sors

had in

living

with the Sales Act and the N.I.L.

lCodification of the Common Law: A Report of the Commission
made

...

his

Excellency the Governor [of Massachusetts], January, 1837
(in Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (1852) 698, 730.
2For an early discussion of these problems by Story, see his lengthy ad
dress: On the Progress of Jurisprudence, delivered to the Suffolk Bar
Association in 1821 (Miscellaneous Writings (1852) 198).
to

3Kent's significantly entitled Commentaries
based

on

College,
office

as

lectures which he delivered

as

on

American

Law

were

Professor of Law in Columbia

a post he had accepted in 1823 on his retirement from judicial
Chancellor of the State of New York. The Commentaries, first

published between 1826 and 1830, had run through four editions by
1840. Story's extraordinary series of treatises were written during his
tenure

as

the Dane Professor of Law

at

Harvard from 1831 until his

death in 1845. It is curious that the flood of

specialized

followed the landmark works of Kent and Story was
by relatively obscure and indistinguished practitioners
hold any academic posts. There
for law books.

was

evidently

an

treatises which

mostly

written

who did

not

insatiable demand

441 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
5For example, Section 6 of the Civil Code provided: "In this State there
is no common law, in any case where the law is declared by the five

(The five
(drafted by a

Codes."

Codes

dure

so-called Practice Commission in

were

the Codes of Civil and Criminal Proce

1849),

the Political
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Code

(1860), the Penal Code (1862) and the Civil Code (1864) (the
having been drafted by a so-called Code Commission ap
pointed in 1857).) With § 6 of the Field Code, compare the "common
law saving clause" in the later Uniform Acts, discussed below at p. 000.
last three

On the

"saving clause" of the Uniform Commercial Code,

see

p. 000

infra.
"The Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918) was, between 1919 and
1945, enacted in only eleven states. The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act

(1927)
(1933)

never enacted
anywhere. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act
widely enacted. However the success of the Trust Receipts
Act was undoubtedly the result of a number of special circumstances,
see 1 Gilmore,
Security Interests in Personal Property (1965) § 4.3.
was

was

7N.I.L. § 196.
8U niform Sales Act § 73.
9The Sales Act was promulgated in 1906. The first edition of Williston
on Sales was in 1909.
"See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
Yale L.J. 1057 (1954).
llFor an 18th century illustration, consider the life history of the bill of

exchange which was the subject of litigation
Doug!. 633, 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781).

in Peacock

v.

Rhodes, 2

12An instructive illustration of the progressive disappearance of
tile paper from circulation
the Federal Reserve Board,

mercantile bill of
Farnsworth &

mercan

be found in the unsuccessful attempt by
prior to World War I, to revive the use of the
can

exchange

under the

Honnold, Commercial

name

Law

of "trace acceptance." See
and Materials) (1965)

(Cases

360

et seq. Despite an earnest attempt by the Federal Reserve to make
the "trade acceptance" attractive to bankers, the bankers evidently pre
ferred to finance short-term sales transactions by taking assignments of
the seller's (non-negotiable) accounts receivable.

13Perhaps
banking

the best

illustration of the N.I.L.'s "anti-sense" in a
of so-called "restrictive indorsements"

single

context was

its

treatment

(in §§ 36,37, 47) (the term includes indorsements "for deposit," "for
so on). For the Code's bank-oriented reformulation of
the problem, see §§ 3-205, 3-206, 4-203, 4-205.

collection" and

14The

most widely enacted statute of this type was the Bank Collection
Code drafted in 1928 under the auspices of the American Bankers Asso
ciation and subsequently adopted in twenty states. The substance of the

ABA Code

was

also largely followed in comprehensive banking legisla

adopted after World

tion

War II in such states

as California and Texas,
such. The ABA drafted its own Code
following a basic policy disagreement with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which had undertaken to pre
pare a Uniform Bank Collection Act. After the split with the ABA, the

which did

not enact

the Code

as

Conference abandoned its project. For a critical evaluation of the ABA
Code, see Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 537
(1936) (Professor Steffen had been the official draftsman of the ill-fated
Uniform Bank Collection Act).
15Section 45 stated a rule of substantial performance with respect to the
right to cancel so-called instalment contracts: this section figured promi

nently in Sales Act case law and was the subject of a good deal of
judicial discussion (see, e.g., the opinion of Cardozo, J., in Helgar Cor
poration v. Warner's Features, 222 N.Y. 449, 119 N.E. 113 (1918». As
to open pricing arrangements, the Sales Act did in fact contain a well
drafted provision (§ 9); curiously, § 9 was almost entirely ignored in
the

litigation

on

pricing

arrangements.

"Thus the formula for recovery of the differential between the

price
to

and the market

accept is

price

on

seller's failure

geared (§ § 64, 67) to the
"accepted").

date

contract

buyer's refusal
when the goods "ought to

to

deliver

or

have been delivered" (or

17Comment, A Suggested Revision of the Contract Doctrine of Anticipa
tory Repudiation, 64 Yale L.J. 85 (1954) collects the Sales Act cases at
p. 99 et seq. The author comments that the courts "have been

the

computation of damages

if

as

present" (id.

free in

99).
18See the admirable discussion of factors in W. W. Story, Sales (1847).
19See U.C.C. § 1-103.
20U.C.C. § 2-705.
21See U.C.C. § 2-306 (Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings);
§ 2-305 (Open Price Term). On open price arrangements under the
Uniform Sales Act, see note 15 supra.
22See particularly U.C.C. §§ 2-202-2-210.
23See note 6 supra.
24See 1 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (1965) § 10.2.
as

no statute

were

at
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25See id. § 9.10.
26See the discussion of what I then conceived
nerve

in

University of Chicago

(Continued from
to

be the failure of

Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale

Gilmore, Legal Realism:

judicial
L.]. 1037

the enormous recent literature.
28See 2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property (1965) § 45.2.
29See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common

Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383 (1964).
not

to

ourselves

permit

ing

a

definite

language.

reduce the past

to indulge in the theoretical ex
philosophical jurists, who believe that
can be provided for in a code, speak

Sufficient for

will be the

us

achievement,

to

order and

certainty; and that this is within our reach
cannot be a matter of speculation."
Story, On the Progress of ]urisprudence (Address to the Suffolk Bar Association, 1821) (Miscellaneous
Writings of Joseph Story (1852) 198, 238.
to

(Continued [rom

page

2)

ruptcy of Insull Utility Investments, Inc. In the liquida
tion of that enterprise his acumen and sound practical
j udgrrient commanded the respect and admiration of
businessmen and lawyers alike, many of whom were
much surprised that a professor could master even the
most intricate problems of that very complicated business

organization.
When Mr.

Bigelow

reached the

University's

retirement

J

Col.

2)

public housing as embodying major
public policy when, in fact, they involved only
issues of method and administration. But only politicians,
by and large, seemed to take seriously their own continu
ing debate over the essential necessity for government's
assumption of broad responsibility for the general welfare.
Not all the demands of social responsibility, of course,
have yet been met. Crime, juvenile delinquency, struc
tural unemployment, bad housing, racial discrimination,
the urban ghetto-these are deeply disturbing and stub
bornly resistant manifestations of our continuing failures.
There is good reason to hope, nevertheless, that they will
eventually yield to massive applications of techniques
and resources we now know how to use. The problem,
essentially, is to find ways-especially in a period of lim
ited but large-scale war-of making such applications
massive enough.
Meanwhile, a new crisis has emerged. Compounded
of population growth, technological change, mass com
munications, and big government, it is a crisis of identity
-a crisis characterized
by the progressive submergence
of a sense of individual significance in a gray, featureless
sea of
homogenized humanity. And though it is a crisis
characterized rather by a sense of vague anxiety and un
ease than by misery and
pain, it is serious nonetheless for

issues of

(1961).

travagances of some well-meaning
all human concerns for the future

page 1

37

Medicare and

as

27See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966). Dean Prosser's excellent article collects

30"We ought

Law School

'

1939, he relinquished the Deanship, but, though
emeritus, continued to teach classes in Conflict of Laws

human

and in

Property.

tial. It is serious because' it

Harry

S. Truman

age in

1947, he

In

be

was

drafted

by

President

member of the National

a

society dedicated from its outset to the liberation of
aspirations and the fulfillment of human poten

Loy

society

in

the work of that agency he
devoted much time and energy during the last years of

which

are

alty

to

Review Board and

his life. One who does

a

to

not

have

access

to

the files of the

Board cannot, of course, know how invaluable to the
nation were his services, but no one who knew how pre
eminent were his qualifications for the difficult and ex

tremely

sensitive work of that agency could fail to be
spite of his failing health, Mr. Bigelow

thankful that, in
had accepted the

appointment.

The service that he rendered

ber of the

Loyalty

Board

was

to
a

the nation

fitting

as

climax

a

mem

to

Mr.

Bigelow's career, and when added to his contributions to
his students, to the Law School to which he had devoted
forty-six years, and to the profession at large, will merit
eternal gratitude and always inspire those who were
privileged to be associated with him.
It is particularly appropriate that the professorship
which Mr. Bigelow's bequest sustains should bear his
name. For it will serve as a
perpetual memorial of a
lifetime of eminently distinguished teaching and scholar
ship that encompassed substantially all of the first half
century of the School's existence, and contributed so bril
liantly toward the realization of Mr. Harper's goal that
the
be

new

Law School of The

worthy

of

a

place

University

of

Chicago should
envisaged.

in the great institution he

portends

the failure of that

serving these ends. And since the processes
blurring the individual's belief in himself are

progressive

and

inexorable,

of

it is hard

and

to

shake off

a sense

darkness.

impending decay
gathering
even the
gloomiest forecast can be useful in identi
fying a challenge=or so, at any rate, "the optimists and
chronic hopers of. the world," as Mencken called us, are
bound to believe. As I see the challenge, it is to maintain,
create and, where necessary and possible, to restore, an
environment for living which, first, is physically safe;
second, provides aesthetic satisfaction; third, encourages
the maximum development of human capacities; fourth,
gives scope for the development of personal relationships
But

in which the need for

affection, mutual respect, and the
dignity can be satisfied; and

of individual

recognition
fifth, affords opportunity for the individual to play a
meaningful part in the shaping of the policies and pro
grams directed toward the four preceding goals.
Now, if I were giving five lectures instead of

one

(and, mind you, this is not a complaint because there is
no conceivable
prospect that I could have prepared more
than

one),

themes.

I would

cheerfully

dilate

on

all of these

Indeed,
you know, my present responsibilities
largely concerned with some of the aspects of public
safety. As to aesthetic satisfaction, I have long felt that if
I could choose any job in the world it would be that of

are

as
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eradicating ugliness in Boston-assuming, of course, that
I were armed with complete authority to promulgate and
enforce zoning ordinances, could exercise the power of
domain, and had at my disposal upwards of a billion
dollars. The third topic-the maximum development of
human capacities-is the central theme of most of my
graduation speeches (as it is, I suppose, of everyone
else's), and the fourth would give me a welcome excuse
to tee off on the tendency to denigrate as the mere product
of

an

adventitious "Protestant ethic" what I
convinced

fully

am

power
moral values rooted in the very sub

are

soil of the human condition.

Regretfully, however,
focus of this lecture

I shall be

obliged

restrict the

to

the last of these five

to

for the individual

objectives

share in
opportunity
the
and
which
shaping
policies
programs
profoundly af
fect the quality of his life. And although some of the

maximum

components of

to

present crisis-population growth and
change, for example-can only indirectly be
our

technological
by the conscious
the same can hardly be

modified
The

former,

after all,

direction of government
said of

are

big
byproducts

policy,

government itself.
of human activity,

while government is its conscious creation. Insofar, there
fore, as remoteness and impersonality, coupled with im

perviousness

to

the

impact

characteristics of

influence of the

or

individual,

government which contribute to
the existence of the current crisis, it can be the deliberate
and specific objective of government to modify and offset
are

big

these characteristics.
And yet it will not do to underestimate the power of
the thrust toward big and still bigger government. It
would be futile, in the first place, even to contemplate a
slowdown in the
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will often be found

ton

state

and local officials whose

relationships within their
level of government, but to the groups centered
around the aims and needs of their own profession or

primary allegiance

is

to

not

own

service.

One of my first

Health, Education,
1957

then Marion

Department of
or
early

the functions of the Children's

analyze

to

was

Bureau and make

in the

assignments

and Welfare back in late 1956

a

Folsom,

recommendation
whether

as to

to

they

the

Secretary,

should

or

should

split up and redistributed among other agencies of
the Department. For me the most significant result of
be

not

that

assignment was the discovery
not really a separate entity

Bureau is
a

bundle of

share

personal relationships

that the Children's
at

all but the

among

core

of

who

people

about maternal and child health
and
services
to
programs
crippled children. This core ex
tends vertically down through all layers of government
into the voluntary agencies having similar concerns; the
ties which bind children's service professionals together
are

ing

a common concern

far stronger than the bureaucratic affiliations connect
them horizontally to the administrators of other
the

at

programs

level of government. The

same

same

phenomenon in many other fields explains why you
often find state and local officials aiding and abetting
exercise of federal power

their

authority

own

which

but which

apparently
actually serves a

so
an

overrides
cherished

program objective that has encountered some state or
local impediment.
The second major component of the centripetal process

springs from the need for reliance upon a taxing author
ity which can disregard inequalities in state and local tax
bases and has

with interstate

interrnunici

growth of all government, as distin
from
the
central
guished
government; the expansion of
action
at
level is an inevitable re
some
governmental
to the
sponse
growing complexity and interdependence

pal competition. These are, to be sure, very substantial
reasons for
major reliance on federal revenue sources for

of

however,

an

fully
tional

urban and

seek

to

pull

however,
the gravita
decades past has been attracting

technological

neutralize and

which for

age. We can,

even

use

to reverse

power toward the center. The first step must be to iden
tify and understand the components of this centripetal

force.
One such component, surely, is the characteristic Amer
ican demand for quick results (I shall have occasion fur
ther on to refer to this as "product demand" or "the

the

financing
over

reliance

state

answer-the direct route-is

to exert

pressure

at a

single

point, call upon federal funds, enact a new law, set up a
new
agency. And at the head of the march on Washing-

reasons

They

for reliance

are

on

not,

federal

the exercise of these functions: the

on

legitimate

bility

or

every

authority

rest

on

need for the exercise of federal

initiative, it

new

must

federal funds from those which derive from

some

it

of

and local functions.

state

for such

governments, thousands of local
hundreds
of thousands of voluntary organi
governments,
zations, and millions of individual people? The ready
scores

or

justifi
independent
grounds. And while it may be impossible in an hyper
trophied federal organ to distinguish those elements in its
growth which are traceable merely to the necessity for
authority

cation

expansion

with

of

in themselves

product")
"End poverty!" "Cure cancer!" "Stop pollution!" In the
face of these categorical imperatives, how can we be any
thing but impatient with the necessity for having to deal
:

no concern

can

hardly

of the federal

responsi

be doubted that

a

new

bureaucracy proportional

increase in federal

expenditures

has

to

generally

been easy to rationalize.
The third element in the
I suppose,

produces,
Washington-is

from

a

the

growth of big government
push toward rather than a pull
incompetence of

state

and local

government. This is not to say, of course, that state and
local governments are mostly incompetent most of the

time; it is
ment,

to

say that

inadequate

inertia, legislative malapportion

salaries and

professional standards,
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adequate staffing, political
interference,
corruption, have all too widely and
too frequently impaired the effectiveness of state and
local government. And in no area have these inadequa
cies been more manifest than in that of planning to meet
restrictions

shortsighted

and

needs and
Now, if this

new

to

on

even

make efficient

use

of available

resources.

major components of
centripetal process proves anything, it is that none is
inherently bad. My own impression, for what it may be
worth, is that the pursuit of power for its own sake has
been a negligible factor; the process is not motivated by
a
willfully totalitarian thrust. One might well ask, then,
why worry about it? And the fact is, of course, despite
Mr. Justice Brandeis' fifty-year-old warning against "The
Curse of Bigness," that until very lately only Republican
orators have seemed to take the warning seriously. In can
dor, however, I think it must be acknowledged that
review of the

quick

the

in government today, because of its contribution
crisis of identity, gives us far greater cause

bigness

to our current

for

concern

than used

to

be

justified.

Inured

though

we

the cry of "Wolf!," even a "liberal" can
now admit that the wolf may indeed be in the neighbor
hood. Just this week, in fact, the senior Senator from
Massachusetts denounced the evils of big government in
have become

a

speech

at

to

Amherst

College.
a
problem

recognition that

But the

exists is

only

understand the

problem, to grasp the relevant principles,
assemble the essential facts, and to exercise resource
fulness in achieving a constructive solution.
to

problem: it is to devise ways
opportunity to playa more
giving
in
meaningful part
shaping the governmental policies
and programs which affect his physical, aesthetic, occu
pational, recreational, and human environment.
How are we to go about this? What real opportunity
is there to involve individuals in matters affecting them?
The first essential, plainly, is the conviction that the goal
is important. And this, in turn, has implications for our
present attitude toward "the product." If we are really as
Let me,

concerned

identity,

has said he would

"Stop!".

Social

security and

appealing,

"socialized

Country

with

Barry

cated

approaches

as

Experience,
of

My

"Life in

urged

the

take

over

which,

as

the federal

and contrive

in

a

was

in

small,

is

1929, long before
a

web of

tangled

to

of revolution tried

periods

to start

afresh

no

very

startling changes. The French Revo
of political power from one class

center

another, but the relations of the individual to the gov
did not very deeply change for long after, if they

ernment

have

ever

changed

at

all. Habit

fabric which could be

woven

was

too

strong for any

from the brain of

[ean

ordinary times at any rate men
have no time and no capacity to draw new patterns for
their society: they must make their living and answer the
other problems of their individual lives. Until something in
the general frame of things is so irritating as to tease them
into action, they go along with what is usual.
Jacques

Rousseau

...

In

"

...

by a private corporation would
in efficiency, the substitution of business
for government bureaucracy is obviously

of the Post Office

pay

bu
not

act.

No, the only conceivable approach that offers

any real

estab
prospect of success is the same one we followed in
the
federal
the
regulatory com
system, inventing
lishing
the
and
mission,
ingenious arrangements of
devising
under which our
functions
and
federal, state,
private

security, employment security, and workmen's
compensation systems are administered. And what is that
approach? Essentially that of a good lawyer: to seek to
social

matter

new

lution shifted the

pro

And while it may well be that Generals
O'Brien and Gavin are right in forecasting that operation

reaucracy
the way to get the citizen into the

Learned Hand

Judge

scheme from the bottom up. The sur
about it is that when they finish they have

a

prising thing
accomplished

recall,

grant-in-aid

tax.

dividends

society"-this

great

for that

have indeed in

a

grams for vocational education and waste treatment con
struction in return for a share of the federal telephone

excise

a

LBJ-"or

sophisti

you may

revered teacher

relations of all sorts, whose adjustment so that it may be
endurable is an extraordinarily troublesome matter. Men

moreover,

such

prepared to accept some sacrifice of
habitually placed on speed and effi
its place an ungrudging preference

once wrote:

that of President Eisenhower's Fed

eral-State Action Committee
states to

even

should be about the crisis of

we

have

be achieved.

medicine," like

bankruptcy

be

premium
ciency and to put in
for citizen participation in collective decisions. Such a
fundamental change in attitude, of course, will not easily

cannot

Goldwater.

I think

as

we must
we

the automobile and automation, are here to stay. Besides,
there just isn't room for all of us out there in Marlboro
has demonstrated the

the

restate

the

possibly
we cannot, as William F. Buckley
like to do, sit astride history screaming

approaches which,
work. For one thing,

then,

the individual the

of

pre
condition to its solution. Then comes the hard part. And
in tackling the hard part, a useful first step is to put aside

however

39

Law School

is

In the present crisis, one hopes that just such an irritant
teasing us into action. For there will be required some

produce the kind of
of governmental
priority
that is already
and
administration
program development
accorded to individual rights in the administration of
criminal justice. Indeed, since governmental programs
are progressively coming to have greater and greater im
thing

like

a

revolution in attitudes

for the individual in the

to

context

pact on more and more of us, it is not, I believe, too
farfetched to suggest that the constitutional compulsion
respect the claims of individual worth and dignity
which is manifested now in the requirements of pro
cedural due process in criminal cases will someday be
to

extended
viduals
esses.

to

are

the guarantee of procedures whereby indi
enabled to participate in governmental proc

There is,

to

be sure,

a

wide difference in directness

40

of
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impact

on

the individual between the trial of

nal

him and the

a

crimi

of billboards

charge against
regulation
along the roadways he uses, but this, arguably, is a differ
ence more
appropriately reflected in the degree of strict
ness of the indicated
procedural safeguards than in their
character.
general
Early signs that just such safeguards
are in fact
developing can perhaps be discerned in recent
judicial pronouncements on the "one man-one vote"
theme, as well as in the recent decision affirming the right
of citizens fighting to preserve the Hudson River Gorge
to be heard "on a basic concern, the
preservation of
natural beauty."
Be that as it may, the task of defining a role for the
individual in the policy-determining process requires the
development of the very sort of criteria for identifying the
functions appropriate for such participation as would
have to be applied in determining when the Constitution
compels it. Let us grant, for example, that the command
of troops in South Viet N am (or South Carolina) is an
obvious example of a function inappropriate for citizen
participation. An equally clear example of the opposite is
the conduct of a neighborhood rehabilitation program.
Most governmental functions, of course, fall somewhere
between these extremes, and among the factors which
can make them more or less suitable for citizen
participa
tion are such variables as the directness of their impact
on the individual, his
family, or his community; the
scope of the geographical area within which, as a matter
of practical necessity, the function must be exercised; the

importance, again

as a

practical

matter, of

uniformity

of
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membership on a policymaking board; for still others,
the right to vote for elected spokesmen, as in the case of
Boston's projected IS-member "Model Neighborhood
Board" under the Model Cities program.
In every such situation it is crucial not only to involve
the right citizen participants, including the recipients of
services

(AFDC mothers, for example), but so to define
their role that their participation will afford a real and
not fictitious
opportunity for citizen participation. In
every case, moreover, it is essential to consider whether
the governmental response should be to encourage citizen

participation through their own voluntary organizations
through representation on some official body.
Massachusetts enacted last year a community mental

or

health program which illustrates
problem of citizen participation.

approach to
Consistently with
one

the

the
of
the
federal
Health
Mental
requirements
Community
Act of 1963, the program establishes a statewide
pattern
of mental-health service areas embracing somewhere be
tween 75,000 and 200,000
people. Generally speaking,
these areas are larger than our cities and towns and
smaller than our counties and thus could not be assimi
lated by any existing governmental structure. There were

number of

compelling reasons, moreover, including the
local taxing authority would be contributing
any substantial amount to the cost of the program, why
its overall direction had to be centered in the state mental
health agency.
Within this framework we gave each area, under an
a

fact that

area

no

director and

a

citizen

board,

a

substantial

degree

of

administration within this area; and the necessity (which
should be held to a minimum) of reliance on technical

autonomy, vesting in the board the power to approve the
selection of the director, to participate in the development

expertise.
Having identified a function which
citizen participation, it then becomes

of the

appropriate for
necessary to ask:

is

First, how, without excessive sacrifice of "product,"
this function be made accessible

to

the

understanding

can

and

impact of the concerned individuals?
Second, who are the individuals-the electorate or con
stituency, in effect-who should be entitled to participate?
Third, what form should this participation take?
The natural and

legitimate concern with school policies
the
by
parents of the children attending an ele
school
in a slum neighborhood should entitle
mentary
shared
them

and

respectful hearing by de
of
education
and
officials,
partment
yet "product" consid
erations inescapably prevent constituting them in effect
as

an

to an

understanding

autonomous

Dwellers in

school board for that
urban

one

school.

effec
congested
neighborhood
on
a
narrow
base
to
tively
together
geographical
secure
in
the
urban
improvements
municipal services;
parents of retarded children, to be comparably effective,
are
likely to want to draw into their organization simi
larly concerned suburban parents. For some purposes, a
a

can

band

neighborhood

action group is the answer; for

others,

area
budget, to approve contracts and other fee-for
service arrangements with voluntary agencies, and certain

other enumerated powers and responsibilities. This an
swered the question of how to make the overall function
to be
performed accessible to citizen participation. The

question of who should participate-the constituency
question-was answered by spelling out various institu
tions, agencies, interest groups, and professions whose
representation on the area board would be required. The
means chosen to
provide a vehicle for citizen participa
tion was, of course, the

area board itself.
This kind of citizen-board is a model I hope
adapted in Massachusetts to similar programs in

to

see

public

welfare, public health, and vocational rehabilitation ad
ministered in areas geographically coextensive both with
each other and with the mental health areas. Indeed,
planning along these lines is already in various stages of
progress. In the case of public welfare and public health,
this will mean administration on the basis of larger geo
graphical units than at present, since in Massachusetts
public welfare and public health have traditionally been

municipal functions. The result, nevertheless,
bring about a net gain in citizen involvement,

should

for the

The
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area

University of Chicago

provide a better vehicle for meaningful
participation than the present system of municipal

boards will

citizen

administration.
Similar considerations

are, I think, applicable to any
the
transcending
municipal boundaries which
problem
subdivide a metropolitan area. Our present reliance on
the fragmented functions of autonomous local units can
clearly be excessive. And yet the fact that such units do
so
conveniently afford opportunities for citizen participa
tion makes it important to continue to rely on them for
those functions that can be handled locally. As it was

written in the 1648 edition of the Laws and Liberties of

Massachusetts, "The Freemen of

every

Township

...

shall have the power to make such Laws and Constitu
not
tions as may concern the welfare of their town
...

repugnant to the public Laws and Orders of the Coun
trie." The question is, what functions can only be handled

metropolitan basis and what functions-or elements
just as well be handled on a municipal,
or
neighborhood basis?
community,
the
Among
things most obviously eligible for adminis
tration on a metropolitan basis are water and sewage, as
was
recognized as long ago as 1889 when Greater Bos
ton's pioneering Metropolitan District Commission was
given these functions. More recent candidates for metro
politan administration are fire and police services. For
on a

thereof-can

these services, however,

one

visualize

can

a

compromise

which would treat training activities, communications,
and reciprocal arrangements for the sharing of informa
tion and specialized personnel on an area-wide basis
while

ity

preserving

a

substantial

degree

of local

responsibil

for other activities.

again, take land use, one of our most troublesome
existing problems and one certain to become more so. We
Or

can't for

long in

the location of

megalopolitan area continue to
industry and low-income housing
any

allow
to

be

products of such uncontrolled circumstances as, for exam
ple, what community gets there first with the most
restrictive

the

most

industrial

zoning by-laws,

or,

as

attractive inducements

plants.

The

pancy is the key to
fication, de facto

a

regulation

host of other

segregation,

the
to

case may be, offers
the location of new

and

occu

problems-social

strati

of land

use

tax-revenue

distribution,

availability of citizen leadership, not to mention such
more obviously land-related matters as access to recrea
tional facilities and open spaces. To solve these problems
demands planning-and that means planning with teeth.
and

But

the face of it, can be done in broad strokes
megalopolis as a whole while leaving the inter

this,

for the

on

mediate details

to

specially

and the ultimate details

to

regional bodies
municipalities, with appro
participation at each level.

constituted

the

priate provision for citizen
The hardest question-and in due course it is bound to
become urgent-is going to be: how much authority over
pri vate decisions must such bodies be allowed to exercise?
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This is, perhaps, a good place to pause and look back
the ground we have covered. We began by recogniz
ing a crisis of identity, and enumerated some of the fac

over

contributing to the growth of the central govern
Having then defined the problem as that of finding
ways of giving the individual a meaningful part in shap
ing the governmental policies and programs which most
directly concern him, we proceeded to consider oppor
tunities of making the individual a direct participant in

tors

ment.

this process. We

come now to

alternative

means

of involv

ing him.
One such alternative offers almost unlimited

for

bringing public

the utilization of

potential

functions within reach of the citizen:
contract

and fee-for-service arrange

private voluntary agencies. Such agencies
have a number of advantages over government agencies
flexibility, receptivity to innovation, and so on-but their
most important asset is that they seek out and enlist the
concern of individuals who care deeply about the agency's
social purpose and the needs it is trying to meet. Millions
of volunteers give time and energy and deep devotion to
Boy Scouts and Boys' Clubs, to community hospitals and
community chests, to little theaters and Little Leagues,
which they would never give to a government program.
It is important, therefore, to expand the role of voluntary
agencies not alone or even primarily for the sake of the
services they perform but for the sake of the opportunity
they give so many people to feel that they are making a
personal contribution to a worthwhile effort.
Government programs can, of course, be so designed as
to displace or to encourage reliance on voluntary agencies
and private organizations. Rhode Island's temporary disa
bility insurance program preempts the field; New York's,
through the option on "contracting out," leaves room for
voluntary arrangements. Medicare, to the extent of the
coverage provided, ousts other forms of insurance (I once
spent most of six months trying to work out a health
insurance scheme for people over 65 which would have
preserved a role for voluntary and commercial carriers);
the community action part of the poverty program (Title
II of the Economic Opportunity Act) invites the involve
ment of voluntary agencies.
Certain other recently enacted federal programs; par
ticularly in the health field, confront us with the urgent
necessity for a choice between the expansion of direct

ments

with

government services and a partnership between govern
ment and private organizations. Medicare, medicaid, the

heart-cancer-stroke program, and the
and child health services called for
Social

Security Act,

not to

expanded maternal
by Title V of the

mention the

community

men

tal health program which has already been discussed,
individually and in combination demand the develop
ment

of better and

low-income
time

to

people.
bring to the

more

accessible health services for

As I've had occasion from time
attention of medical groups

just

to
as
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forcefully as I know how, either this demand will be met
by cooperation between voluntary health services and
public health agencies through various contractual ar

munity service officers" who, under the Commission's
recommendation, would operate out of storefront head

else government will be forced
rangements,
and staff its own clinics.

lawyers who, in represent
ing
indigent,
only provide needed assistance
in matters that are traditional functions of the lawyer but
will also serve as spokesmen for poor people in their
dealings with government agencies.
I'm not yet convinced, however, that we should take
the additional step of creating an ombudsman whose
charge would be to serve as an omnicompetent champion
of the people in their relationships with government be

or

to

build

the

I have elsewhere tried to spell out what I think are
the very real human considerations that favor this kind
of partnership over the direct purveying of government
medicine. For present purposes it will have to suffice to

cite

this

point Dr. Bertram Brown, former head of
community mental health program in the National
Institute of Mental Health, now Deputy Director of the
on

the

Institute, who has said that the development of

commu

nity mental health programs throughout the nation de
mands wherever possible a "coalition of resources"-a
in other

coalition,
services
come

words, which draws upon whatever
provided by the agencies that have already
being as an expression of community concern

can

into

be

with the

problems of mental health.
approach toward offsetting the bigness of gov
ernment and bringing it within reach of the citizen re
quires the evolution of a number of new kinds of people
Another

whose roles would have in

common the function of serv
link
between
the
citizen and government.
ing
One such person would have a role best described, per
haps, as that of "neighborhood counsellor." As matters
now stand, all the established
categorical disciplines such
as

a

public health, public welfare, mental health, and voca
rehabilitation, have to rely on individuals filling
roles which in practice draw much more .heavily on a
basic understanding of human problems and on a general
knowledge of the capacities of more specialized fields
than on any specific professional training such individuals
may once have had. Public health nurses, public welfare
caseworkers, psychiatric social workers, and rehabilitation
counsellors all, in their day-to-day work, devote a large
part of their time to this kind of counselling and referral.
The burgeoning complexities of governmental pro
grams and the continuing subdivision of old professions
into new sub-specialties combine to make counselling and
referral, at the first point of contact by a government
agency with people in need of help, increasingly impor
as

tional

tant. In view of this, it makes sense, I believe, to visualize
educational programs designed from the outset to train
people for this essential service-people who would be
come as
intimately familiar with the urban neighbor

hoods in which
his

own

rural

they

area

serve as an

and who

agricultural

could,

in

agent with

addition, help

to

mobilize the interest and the skills of the

non-professionals"

who should

play an
community-oriented

portant part in all
A second area in which

"indigenous
increasingly im

programs.
similar function can be per
formed is in law enforcement and police protection.

Indeed, this would
alized

by

quarters in slum areas.
Thirdly, there is a need for

a

appear to be very much the role visu
National
Crime Commission for the "comthe

will

not

not sure that we can
expect a man both to cover
broad range and to be able to do it effectively.
And I see these three-the neighborhood counsellor, the
cause

I'm

such

a

lawyer

for the poor, and the

community

between them

that

service officer

ombudsman
doing everything
better.
it
doing
But to make these various approaches toward meaning
ful citizen participation in government really effective,
we must reverse the
pull toward the center exerted by
of
present systems
financing governmental functions. To
as

an

could do and

point made earlier, we should realize that the
level of government at which money is collected and dis
bursed has no logical relevance to the question of where
restate a

given program should be administered. The fact is,
however, that it has often had a decisive influence, and
the result is a dilution of citizen participation not offset
by any product advantage. It should follow, therefore, as
any

a

of government, that reliance for
lower level of government on a
should never in itself be a reason for giving
level administrative jurisdiction over the pro

consistent

principle
by

financial assistance

higher one
the higher

a

grams thus assisted.
Recognition of this

important by

the

mental services

principle is made all the more
explosive growth of demand for govern

at

the lower levels of government, since
inequality in their taxable resources

the combination of
and of

competition

among them

entirely legiti
seeking assistance from above.
Thus, revenue sharing by the federal government with
the states is just as necessary and desirable as revenue
sharing by the states with local governments. It follows,
moreover, that insofar as the justification for revenue
sharing depends on inequalities among tax bases, the
mate

reasons

revenue

to

creates

for their

be distributed should be shared

on

a

basis

favoring the poorest states and communities. To let the
vol ume of income taxes collected within the boundaries
of

be the measure of the share of federal
receivable by that state would be just as wrong
as to make the total amount of real-estate taxes collected
within a given municipality the measure of the state
revenue allocable to that
municipality.
a

given

state

revenue

For these

reasons

the lines of the bill

I favor

a

revenue-sharing plan along

(S.482) proposed by

Senator

Javits,
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The

which is based

on

principles underlying the Heller
Javits' bill, however, only 15% of

the

Plan. Under Senator
the funds

be shared would be distributed

to

the

favoring

low-income

states;

on

basis

preference

own

my

a

distribute the entire amount, as in the case
of many existing grant-in-aid programs, under a for
mula inversely weighting per capita income. In order, at
would be

to

amount

have

to

rate,

any

a

significant equalizing effect,

of federal funds thus distributable should
like

reach

ally
something
expenditures, or, at their

20%

of all

state

the

eventu

and local

present rate, about $17.4 billion.
This amount, added to present categorical grants of
another $10.7 billion, would bring total federal aid

expenditures to about one-third of all state and local ex
penditures-which would seem to me about the right
proportion.
A second type of federal assistance

(included

in the

categorical grant total given above) should take the form
of block grants for such broad functional purposes as
education
no

or

restriction

health

public
beyond

the

or

mental

health, subject

requirement

that

they

be

to
ex

pended for these purposes. Some of this money, depend
ing on other pressures on the federal budget, might be
new, but much of it, at the outset, could be obtained by
cutting the strings
lished grant-in-aid

longer

ments no

the funds furnished under estab

on

programs whose

state-plan require

necessary purpose. The creation

serve a

of these block grants, moreover, should be accompanied
by the initiation of a regular and continuing procedure

for the

reappraisal of grant-in-aid programs to determine
when their stimulatory or standard-setting purpose has
been sufficiently well fulfilled to justify their transfer
into the block-grant category. As leading candidates for
early transfer, I would nominate the old vocational edu
cation programs, the "impacted areas" program, and
of the titles of the National Defense Education Act,
in whose drafting I had a considerable share.
some

I

well

that this

"put-it-on-the-stump
approach (which is what we used to call it
when I was at HEW) has been criticized as involving an
abdication of the federal responsibility to see to the wise
use of federal funds-a
complete abdication in the case
of revenue-sharing per se, nearly so in the case of block
Now,

am

aware

and-run"

grants. But the short answer is that the money isn't
"federal" money at all; it's just collected through use of

taxing power. And the only reason for relying
on the federal
taxing power to collect this money is to
take advantage of the federal tax base for the benefit of
the federal

the

states.

The federal government would not otherwise
to collect it at all. There exists, therefore,

have occasion

no more reason

ture

collected

by

the

In addition

supervision over the expendi
over the expenditure of funds

for, federal

of these funds than
states

to

themselves.

these

there should continue

to

two

be
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types of federal assistance,
grant-in-aid programs of the

kind

fied

used

widely

now so

student,

ate
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(a Brandeis University gradu
stopped counting, recently identi

before he

than 200 separate grant programs in HEW
But
since such programs demand a substantial
alone).
of
federal
direction and since they evidently can
degree
not

more

be divorced from

a

built-in

cades of

tendency

to

should have

generate cas
bear-and

paperwork, they
throughout their existence continue to sustain-a substan
tial burden of proving that their stimulatory and stand
ard-setting function is really necessary.
Finally, there will remain a nee'd for project grants for
research and demonstration purposes, subject also to peri
odic reappraisal to determine when the project-grant
program has reached a stage mature enough to be in
cluded in the nearest categorical grant-in-aid program,
from there moved into the block-grant stage, and, ulti
mately perhaps, consigned to the revenue-sharing pro
to

gram.
To recapitulate, it is

possible to identify a number of
potentially
approaches toward giving the indi
vidual a greater influence on the forces which shape his
environment: the breakdown of governmental functions
into segments that can be adapted to citizen participation;
the expanded use of contracts and fee-for-service arrange
ments with private organizations; the use of people who
can serve as a link between the individual, the neighbor
hood, and governmental agencies; and the development
useful

of less restrictive

means

functions

of federal financial assistance
the

to

and local levels.

governmental
Quite plainly, however, none of these approaches is self
executing; they must be consciously pursued. And so it
to me

seems

that

one

at

more

state

needed, and that

element is

is the creation of mechanisms for the

planning

of decen

tralization itself.
As coordinator of

health, education, and welfare

grams in Massachusetts

during

the last

gradually learned that the greatest
velopment and administration is
among

agencies

and

across

two

pro

years, I

need in program de
for joint planning

the lines of

professional

disci

plines. And ;yet the lack of machinery for this purpose
is glaringly 'Obvious. On the one side, such planning must
and embrace the many points at which
aimed
at meeting human needs overlap' or
programs
impinge on each other. On the other, it must be finely
be

comprehensive

capable of coping with the par
problems requiring a specific response.
And within each of these subdivisions the planning proc
ess must concern itself
directly with the ways in which
enough

subdivided

to

be

ticular kinds of

citizen

essentially,
wide

be built into the system-a task,
constitution-making for an enormously

participation
of

variety

can

of situations.

I drafted last year a bill which in the present Congress
has been sponsored by Senator Hill, the Chairman of the
Senate Committee

Javits, the

on

Labor and Public

ranking Republican

on

Welfare,

Senator

the Committee, and

a
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number of other Senators, and which would provide fedleadership and funds for just this kind of planning.
And while it is true that enactment of this bill would

Exits and Entrances

eral
on

its face

mean

a

step in the direction of still

bigger

government, unless state and local governments develop
the capacity to plan-and particularly to plan for ways of
involving the individual citizen-the forces controlling
our

lives will continue

and less and less

to

become

more

and

more

remote

George

E.

Hormel has been

responsive.

Mr. Fee
uation. He

statewide campaign, I suddenly remembered the
dedication of a book I once read which goes something
like this:

he

long

"This book is dedicated

some

times called 'the little

know

they're just

as

big

as

to the people who are
people.' Well, I want you to

Book

came

to

as

the Law School

man

environment in which every
preserve
whoever he is, feels just as big as you are,
an

are

greatly

his

grad

Brown and
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Company

when
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office;
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A Publication
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years ago. As Dean of Students, he will be responsible
for the selection of students in the J.D. program, for
student aid in the same area, and such matters as course

them if it fails
whoever you

source
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serving
Department of Little,
was

Admissions and

individual,

major

practiced briefly

Our government exists for and because of individual
people, and it will have failed in its responsibilities to
to

a

School in his six years in that
missed.

three years ago, looking at the faces of thou
sands and thousands of people during the course of a
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Fee, Jr., JD'63, has been appointed Dean of

Students in the Law School, succeeding James C. Hormel,
JD'SH, whose resignation was effective June 30, 1967. Mr.
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